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I. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)1 is not a popular law.2  
Enacted in 1986 to deal with the nascent computer crimes of that era, it has 
aged badly.  It has been widely criticized as vague, poorly structured, and 
having an overly broad definition of loss that invites prosecutorial abuse.3  
 
 1 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2018). 
 2 See, e.g., Grant Burningham, The Most Hated Law on the Internet and Its Many 
Problems, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 16, 2016), http://www.newsweek.com/most-hated-law-internet-
and-its-many-problems-cfaa-448567 [http://perma.cc/SW7Y-YU2Q] (describing criticisms 
of the CFAA by defense attorneys and security researchers); Brian Feldman, Our Legal System 
Has No Idea How to Handle Computer Crimes, N.Y. MAGAZINE (Apr. 14, 2016), 
http://nymag.com/selectall/2016/04/matthew-keys-sentencing-computer-crimes.html [http://
perma.cc/WTB4-2UQT] (describing the CFAA as “lagging 30 years behind” technology and 
“pos[ing] a danger to anyone who touches a computer”); Molly Sauter, Online Activism and 
Why the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Must Die, BOING BOING (Sept. 26, 2014), 
https://boingboing.net/2014/09/26/fuckthecfaa.html [http://perma.cc/YZ33-GQ6A] (arguing 
that the CFAA criminalizes online activism). 
 3 See, e.g., Jennifer S. Granick, Faking It: Calculating Loss in Computer Crime 
Sentencing, 2 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 207 (2006); Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges 
to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1561 (2010); Orin S. Kerr, 
Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in Computer Misuse 
Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1616 (2003). See generally Paul J. Larkin, Jr., United States 
v. Nosal: Rebooting the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 8 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 257 (2012) 
(writing that “neither the text of the [CFAA] nor the litigation conducted to date draws a clear 
line separating lawful from unlawful conduct”); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, The Law of the Zebra, 
28 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 155 (2013) (arguing that “courts overzealously sanction defendants 
with CFAA penalties in addition to contract remedies”); Vasileios Karagiannopoulos, From 
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These criticisms only increased when Aaron Swartz committed suicide in 
2013 after he was threatened with up to 35 years in prison for downloading 
millions of academic papers from an online database.4 
One of the problems with sentencing under the CFAA has received little 
attention: a misalignment between the facts that affect sentencing and the 
importance of those facts to the seriousness of CFAA crimes. It has been 
observed, for example, that CFAA sentences escalate rapidly as (easily 
inflated) losses increase.5  But this escalation may be rapid not only in an 
absolute sense, but in disproportion to other attributes of the crime.  Other 
factors, such as the offender’s motivation, the context of the crime, its scope, 
or the type of data affected, may play a larger role in the seriousness of a 
crime. 
The purpose of this piece is to explore that potential misalignment 
between punishment and perceptions through a series of empirical 
experiments that measure public opinions about cybercrime.  Experimental 
measurement of public opinion has been used to study crime seriousness 
since at least the 1960s.6  Criminal law codifies social norms, which manifest 
as perceptions that can be empirically measured.7  More generally, public 
opinion influences policymaking.8  Criminal codes “reflect through the state 
 
Morris to Nosal: The History of Exceeding Authorization and the Need for a Change, 30 J. 
MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 465, 477 (2014) (arguing that the case law provides 
a “confusing mix of interpretations” of the CFAA in the employment law context). 
 4 See, e.g., David Thaw, Criminalizing Hacking Not Dating: Reconstructing the CFAA 
Intent Requirement, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 907, 910 (2013); John Dean, Dealing 
With Aaron Swartz in the Nixonian Tradition: Overzealous Overcharging Leads to a Tragic 
Result, JUSTIA (25 Jan. 2013), https://verdict.justia.com/2013/01/25/dealing-with-aaron-
swartz-in-the-nixonian-tradition [http://perma.cc/2HGS-S49P] (arguing that Swartz killed 
himself because the Boston U.S. Attorney’s Office “was planning to forever ruin him over an 
apparent act of civil disobedience”); Jennifer Granick, Towards Learning from Losing Aaron 
Swartz, CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Jan 4, 2013), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2013/01/
towards-learning-losing-aaron-swartz [http://perma.cc/LU4P-2MG5] (discussing, shortly 
after Aaron Swartz’s suicide, his case and the problem of “prosecutorial overreaching”); 
Marcia Hoffmann, In the Wake of Aaron Swartz’s Death, Let’s Fix Draconian Computer 
Crime Law, EFF (Jan. 14, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/01/aaron-swartz-fix-
draconian-computer-crime-law [http://perma.cc/J2SF-2BWT] (discussing “extremely 
problematic elements” of the CFAA that made it possible for the government to “throw[] the 
book at Aaron for accessing MIT’s network and downloading scholarly research”). 
 5 See, e.g., Granick, supra note 3, at 211. 
 6 See, e.g., Michael O’Connell & Anthony Whelan, Taking Wrongs Seriously, 36 BRIT. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 299, 299 (1996); Part B, infra. 
 7 See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 2, 
456–58 (1997); Paul H. Robinson et al., The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice, 60 VAND. 
L. REV. 1633, 1635 (2007). 
 8 See, e.g., Amy L. Anderson et al., Residency Restrictions for Sex Offenders: Public 
Opinion on Appropriate Distances, 26 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 262, 263–64 (2015); Eric P. 
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legislature’s deliberations and actions some understanding, however dim and 
remote, of what ‘the public’ deems appropriate for the crimes in question.”9  
Although public perceptions of the criminal justice system are flawed,10 these 
perceptions influence how crimes are defined, what punishments they carry, 
whether those punishments are believed to be fair, and how resources are 
allocated to enforcement. 
We report on the results of two studies with over 2,600 respondents: 
(1) a series of six between-subjects experiments and (2) a factorial vignette 
survey experiment.  We conducted these two types of studies to take 
advantage of the benefits of each methodology.  The factorial vignette 
methodology has been used to investigate how different factors of a crime 
(such as the offender’s race, income, and gender) affect perceptions of that 
crime.11  The between-subjects methodology, in contrast, allows us to ask 
more questions about each vignette as well as tailor the specifics of each 
vignette to increase plausibility. 
Our results provide empirical support for arguments that CFAA 
sentencing is miscategorized in the federal sentencing guidelines.  Although 
an attacker’s motivation, the type of data affected, and the amount of loss are 
all statistically significant factors in perceived seriousness, the weight placed 
on financial loss in sentencing calculations is not reflected in public attitudes.  
Another factor in CFAA sentencing—the target of the crime—appears to 
have no statistically significant effect on perceptions.  In contrast, the most 
important factor in ratings of seriousness—the attacker’s motivation—has 
much less of an effect on sentencing.  These results suggest that CFAA 
sentences are indeed out of alignment with the public’s views. 
The rest of this piece proceeds as follows.  Part 0 provides background 
information.  In Part II.A, we discuss the factors that affect the maximum 
sentences under the CFAA and the factors that determine the recommended 
sentences under the federal sentencing guidelines; in Part II.B, we summarize 
previous work on crime seriousness.  Part III presents the methodology, 
 
Baumer & Kimberly H. Martin, Social Organization, Collective Sentiment, and Legal 
Sanctions in Murder Cases, 119 AM. J. SOC. 131, 132 (2013); Paul Burstein, The Impact of 
Public Opinion on Public Policy: A Review and an Agenda, 56 POL. RES. Q. 29, 29–30 (2003); 
Justin T. Pickett et al., Public (Mis)Understanding of Crime Policy: The Effects of Criminal 
Justice Experience and Media Reliance, 26 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 500, 501 (2015). 
 9 Peter H. Rossi et al., Beyond Crime Seriousness: Fitting the Punishment to the Crime, 1 
J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 59, 60 (1985). 
 10 See generally, e.g., Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion, Crime, and Criminal Justice, 16 
CRIME & JUST. 99 (1992) (noting that the public has limited knowledge of the criminal justice 
system, holds misperceptions about crime rates and other statistics, and may be biased by 
sensationalistic news coverage). 
 11 See infra note 97 and accompanying text. 
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model, and results of our between-subjects experiments.  Part IV presents our 
factorial vignette survey experiment.  Part 0 discusses the implications of our 
results and concludes. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. FACTORS AFFECTING SENTENCING UNDER THE COMPUTER 
FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT 
As with all non-capital federal crimes, sentencing under the CFAA is 
determined by statutory provisions and federal sentencing guidelines.  The 
statute sets maximum sentences based on the nature of the crime.12  The 
sentencing guidelines determine the recommended sentencing range based 
on aspects of both the crime and relevant conduct.13  The rest of this section 
discusses how various factors of a CFAA crime affect maximum and 
recommended sentences. 
1. Maximum Sentences 
The CFAA criminalizes six types of conduct as “computer crime.”14 In 
general terms, these are (1) obtaining information,15 (2) accessing 
government computers,16 (3) committing computer fraud,17 (4) causing 
damage with or to a computer,18 (5) trafficking in passwords,19 and (6) 
extorting money by threatening to obtain information or damage a 
computer.20  Table 1 summarizes the CFAA sections and the maximum 
sentences for each.  As the table shows, the base maximum sentence for most 
CFAA crimes is one year except for computer fraud and extortion, which 
have maximum sentences of five years for a first offense,21 and accessing 
 
 12 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c). 
 13 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2B1.1, 2B2.3, 2M3.2, 2X1.1 (U.S. 
Sentencing Comm’n 2015).  
 14 For in-depth discussions of the CFAA, see generally Computer Crime & Intellectual 
Prop. Section Crim. Div., DEP’T OF JUST., PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES, 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ccmanual.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/8N8N-2FU9]; Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope, supra note 2. 
 15 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)–(2). 
 16 Id. § 1030(a)(3). 
 17 Id. § 1030(a)(4). 
 18 Id. § 1030(a)(5). 
 19 Id. § 1030(a)(6). 
 20 Id. § 1030(a)(7). 
 21 Id. § 1030(c). 
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national security information, with a maximum sentence of ten years for a 
first offense.22 
Two provisions can increase the maximum sentence.  The first applies 
to CFAA crimes of accessing information, accessing government computers, 
or trafficking in passwords.  The maximum sentence for any of these offenses 
increases to five years if (i) “the offense was committed for purposes of 
commercial advantage or private financial gain,” (ii) the offense was 
committed “in furtherance of any criminal or tortious act in violation of the 
Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State,” or (iii) “the value 
of the information obtained exceeds $5000.”23 
The other provision is a two-dimensional scale that increases maximum 
sentences for computer damage based on the amount of damage and the level 
of intent.  Recklessly causing damage carries a maximum sentence of five 
years if the conduct led to at least $5,000 in loss, impaired medical treatment, 
caused physical injury, posed a threat to public health or safety, damaged any 
computer used by the U.S. government “in furtherance of the administration 
of justice, national defense, or national security,” or damaged ten or more 
computers.24  If the offender intentionally caused any of the forms of damage 
listed above, the maximum sentence increases to ten years.25  And if the 
offender intentionally caused serious bodily injury or death, the maximum 
sentence increases to twenty years or life, respectively.26 
If the data obtained in a cybercrime includes “a means of identification 
of another person,” the crime can be charged under the identity theft 
 
 22 Id. § 1030(a). 
 23 Id. § 1030(a)(2), (c)(2)(B). 
 24 Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i). 
 25 Id. § 1030(c)(4)(B)(ii). 
 26 Id. § 1030(c)(4)(E)–(F). 
Table 1: CFAA Sections and Maximum Sentences 
Section Description Max. Sentence 
1030(a)(1) Obtaining national security information 10 (20) 
1030(a)(2) Obtaining information 1 or 5 (10) 
1030(a)(3) Accessing government computers 1 or 5 (10) 
1030(a)(4) Computer fraud 5 (10) 
1030(a)(5)(A) Intentional damage 1, 10, 20, or life (20 or life) 
1030(a)(5)(B) Reckless damage 1 or 5 (10) 
1030(a)(5)(C) Negligent damage 1 (10) 
1030(a)(6) Trafficking in passwords 1 or 5 (10) 
1030(a)(7) Computer extortion 5 (10) 
Note: Maximum sentences for a second offense are listed in parentheses. 
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statutes.27 A conviction for identity theft carries a maximum sentence of five 
years.28  Most computer-connected identity theft crimes will also subject the 
offender to prosecution under the aggravated identity theft statute, which 
adds two years imprisonment to a felony conviction under the CFAA.29 
Maximum sentences under the statute thus depend on the facts of a 
crime.  The maximum sentence can increase based on scope, motive, 
consequences, context, and the type of information accessed.  Scope refers to 
the number of victims.  A CFAA crime that damages ten or more computers 
has a five-year maximum sentence based on scope.30  Motive is reflected in 
an increased maximum sentence of five years for obtaining information for 
purposes of commercial advantage or financial gain.31  The consequences of 
a CFAA crime can increase sentences through the $5000 loss threshold in 
certain subsections32 and through maximum sentences that grow longer as 
damage increases to include physical injury, serious bodily injury, or death.33  
By context, we mean the type of organization or computer victimized.  The 
increase in maximum sentence by five or ten years for damaging government 
computers is an example.34  And the type of information matters too: 
accessing identifying information such as social security numbers can 
increase the maximum sentence to five years or add two years to the imposed 
sentence.35  If an offender accessed classified national security information, 
the maximum sentence for a first offense increases to ten years.36 
2. Sentencing Guidelines 
Although the statute sets maximum sentences, sentence lengths within 
those maximums are largely determined by the federal sentencing guidelines.  
Promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission pursuant to the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,37 the guidelines are intended to “provide 
certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding 
 
 27 Id. § 1028(a)(7). The offender must also have acted “with the intent to commit, or to 
aid or abet, or in connection with, any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal 
law, or that constitutes a felony under any applicable State or local law.”  
 28 Id. § 1028(b)(2)(B).  
 29 Id. § 1028A(a)(1). 
 30 Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i), (B)(i). 
 31 Id. § 1030(c)(2)(B).  
 32 Id. § 1030(a)(4), (c)(2)(B), (c)(4)(A)(i)(I), (c)(4)(B)(i). 
 33 Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(III), (c)(4)(B)(i), (c)(4)(E), (c)(4)(F). 
 34 See id. § 1030(a)(5), (c)(4)(A)(i)(V), (c)(4)(B)(i). 
 35 Id. §§ 1028(b)(2)(B), 1028A(a)(1). 
 36 Id. § 1030(a)(1), (c)(1). 
 37 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. §§ 3511–3673, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998). 
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unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records 
who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining 
sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted[.]”38 
The sentencing range recommended under the guidelines is a function 
of the crime’s offense level and the offender’s criminal history.  To find the 
sentencing range for a particular conviction, a court determines the offense 
level and criminal history category then consults the table reproduced in this 
article in Table 7.  The offense level and criminal history category intersect 
at a sentencing range in months. 
The offense level depends primarily on characteristics of the crime 
itself, such as the number of victims, amount of loss, and mitigating or 
aggravating factors, although offender characteristics can also play a part. 
For example, minimum offense levels apply to “career offenders.”39  The 
criminal history category is based on the offender’s previous convictions and 
the length of previous sentences. Someone with no prior offenses has a 
criminal history category of I. 
Most CFAA offenses are sentenced under section 2B1.1 of the 
guidelines, which covers theft, fraud, and similar economic crimes.40  The 
exceptions are (a)(1) (obtaining national security information), which is 
sentenced under section 2M3.2, and (a)(3) (accessing government 
computers) and (a)(7) (extortion), which are sentenced under section 2B2.3.41  
The base offense level for most CFAA crimes is six.42  Computer extortion 
has a base offense level of eighteen, and unauthorized access to national 
security information carries a base offense level of thirty.43 
One of the largest factors that can increase an offense level is the amount 
of loss caused.  Section 2B1.1(b)(1) lists a sliding scale of enhancements 
based on the actual or intended loss resulting from the crime.  As of the 2016 
guidelines, the enhancements range from two levels for a crime with at least 
$6,500 in loss to thirty levels for a crime with at least $550 million in loss.44  
That increase is roughly equivalent to an additional 8 to 10 years in prison 
 
 38 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B). 
 39 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2016). 
 40 Id. app. A (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2016) (indexing statutes to sentencing guidelines 
sections). 
 41 Id.  
 42 Id. § 2B1.1. Access to government computers that does not lead to obtaining national 
security information has a base offense level of four, see § 2B2.3, but because a two-point 
enhancement mirrors the language of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(3) the effective base level is six. 
 43 Id. §§ 2B3.2, 2M3.2. 
 44 Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1). Section 2B2.3, which applies to access to a government computer, 
also uses this loss scale. 
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(although maximum sentences may reduce that difference).  $550 million 
may seem unlikely for a hacking crime, but the CFAA is prone to inflated 
loss calculations.45  For example, Aaron Swartz allegedly downloaded 
4.8 million articles that cost $19 each to download from JSTOR.46  Had his 
case gone to trial, prosecutors might have argued that JSTOR suffered 
$90 million in losses. 
The guidelines also prescribe harsher sentences for crimes with greater 
scope.  For example, the 2015 guidelines provide for a two-level 
enhancement—roughly a 25% increase in sentence length—for a crime with 
ten or more victims or at least one victim who suffered “substantial financial 
hardship.”47  If more than five victims suffered substantial financial hardship, 
the enhancement is four levels, while more than twenty-five victims suffering 
substantial financial hardship triggers a six-point enhancement.48 
The picture that emerges is that the guidelines place tremendous 
importance on loss.  A crime that caused substantial financial hardship to 
twenty-five or more victims receives a six-level enhancement—the same as 
$40,000 in losses.  But it is complicated.  The enhancements for loss and 
number of victims are not independent because a computer crime with more 
victims may also be more costly. 
The type of information obtained is another salient feature in the 
calculation.  Enhancements include a two-point increase in offense level 
(with a minimum offense level of 12) when the crime involved the use or 
transfer of an “authentication feature” or “means of identification”49 and a 
 
 45 See, e.g., Granick, supra note 3, at 214–18 (arguing that “the most easily measurable 
type of harm that accrues from a computer attack is both unrelated to the severity of the 
intrusion and subject to manipulation by victims”); Orin S. Kerr, Trespass, Not Fraud: The 
Need for New Sentencing Guidelines in CFAA Cases, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1544, 1556–58 
(2016) (noting that losses in CFAA sentencing “are unpredictable and usually outside the 
defendant’s control.”). 
 46 Indictment, United States v. Swartz, No. 1:11-cr-10260 at 9 (D. Mass. July 14, 2011); 
Open Access à la Pirate Bay, SCIENCEGUIDE (JULY 26, 2011), https://www.scienceguide.nl/2 
011/07/open-access-a-la-pirate-bay/ [http://perma.cc/4YMX-V7SV] (last visited Dec. 14, 
2016). 
 47 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A). “Substantial financial 
hardship” includes, among other things, becoming insolvent, filing for bankruptcy, suffering 
“substantial loss” of a savings fund, and suffering “substantial harm” to the victim’s ability to 
obtain credit. Id. § 2B1.1, cmt.4(F). 
 48 Id. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B)–(C). Prior to the 2015 amendments, there was no requirement for 
“substantial financial hardship.” A crime involving 10 or more victims would receive a two-
level enhancement, a crime involving 50 or more victims would receive a four-level 
enhancement, and a crime involving at least 250 victims would receive a six-point 
enhancement. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(2). The addition of “substantial financial hardship” to the criteria 
suggests that the sentencing commission wanted to de-emphasize the effect of scope.  
 49 Id. § 2B1.1(b)(11). 
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separate two-point increase if the offense involved “an intent to obtain 
personal information” or “unauthorized public dissemination of personal 
information.”50  The penalty for accessing national defense information 
increases the base offense level from thirty to thirty-five if the information 
was classified Top Secret.51 
Enhancements may also be based on the target of a crime (what we refer 
to as the “context”).  If a CFAA crime involved a system used in critical 
infrastructure or “by or for a government entity in furtherance of the 
administration of justice, national defense, or national security,” the offense 
level increases by two.52  An additional six-point enhancement applies if the 
offense caused “substantial disruption of a critical infrastructure.”53 
These are only some of the provisions that can affect the calculation of 
offense level.  Other adjustments could apply depending on the offender’s 
role in the crime,54 acceptance of responsibility,55 use of a “special skill”56 or 
“sophisticated means,”57 and motivation.58  Many of these may easily apply 
to certain crime patterns.  For example, damage to government computers for 
political purposes might qualify for enhancement based on “terrorism” as a 
motive.59 
B. CRIMINOLOGICAL STUDIES OF CRIME SERIOUSNESS 
Criminologists have been studying perceptions of crime seriousness for 
nearly a hundred years.60  In 1922, Willis Clark asked 100 people to “grade” 
 
 50 Id. § 2B1.1(b)(17). 
 51 Id. § 2M3.2. 
 52 Id. § 2B1.1(b)(18)(i). Section 2B2.3 of the guidelines, applying to trespass, contains a 
similar provision. 
 53 Id. § 2B1.1(b)(18)(iii). 
 54 See id. §§ 3B1.1–3B1.5. 
 55 See id. § 3E1.1. 
 56 Id. § 3B1.3 (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2016). A “special skill” is defined as “a skill not 
possessed by members of the general public and usually requiring substantial education, 
training or licensing.” Id. § 3B1.3 cmt.4. 
 57 Id. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C). Sophisticated means are defined as “especially complex or 
especially intricate offense conduct pertaining to the execution or concealment of an offense.” 
Id. § 2B1.1 cmt.9(B). Unlike the special-skills enhancement, which applies to all crimes, the 
sophisticated-means enhancement applies only to calculations under section 2B1.1. 
 58 See id. §§ 3A1.1, 3A1.4. 
 59 See 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (2015); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4. 
 60 For comprehensive reviews of the crime seriousness literature, see generally Gary 
Sweeten, Scaling Criminal Offending, 28 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 533, 533 (2012) 
(reviewing “a century of research on creating theoretically meaningful and empirically useful 
scales of criminal offending”); Stelios Stylianou, Measuring Crime Seriousness Perceptions: 
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on a scale from one to ten the seriousness of 148 acts of delinquency 
committed by schoolboys.61  Categorizing these acts into different types 
(truancy, stealing, “incorrigibility,” “malicious mischief,” etc., up to and 
including murder), Clark generated a numerical valuation for the seriousness 
of each offense. 
Despite Clark’s work and other early efforts,62 Sellin and Wolfgang are 
generally credited with the pioneering empirical research.63  They sought to 
create a data-based index of delinquency that could be used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of efforts to combat juvenile crime.64  Although much of their 
work involved measuring and classifying delinquency based on statistics 
such as offense rates, they also believed that a measure of delinquency must 
account for seriousness.65  They therefore conducted the first rigorous and 
comprehensive empirical study of attitudes towards crime by surveying 
judges, police, and college students in Philadelphia to come up with rankings 
for 141 different offenses.66  Other scholars soon replicated and extended 
their work.67 
In the half century since then, the study of crime seriousness has 
continued to be an active area of criminological research.  The threads 
developed in that area of research tackle several questions: What is 
“seriousness?”  What are its components?  What are the properties of a useful 
seriousness scale?  How do people form judgments of seriousness?  By what 
methodologies can it be measured?  Is there a consensus on the seriousness 
of crimes?  What are the perceptions of crime seriousness? 
 
What Have We Learned and What Else Do We Want to Know, 31 J. CRIM. JUST. 37 (2003) 
(reviewing empirical studies of crime seriousness perceptions from 1964 through 2000). 
 61 Willis W. Clark, CAL. BUREAU OF JUV. RES. BULL. 11, WHITTIER SCALE FOR GRADING 
JUVENILE OFFENSES (1922); see also John Henderson Gorsuch, Scale of Seriousness of Crimes, 
29 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 245, 245 (1938). 
 62 See Sweeten, supra note 60, at 535–37. 
 63 See, e.g., Peter H. Rossi et al., The Seriousness of Crimes: Normative Structure and 
Individual Differences, 39 AM. SOC. REV. 224, 225 (1974) (“The most extensive previous 
treatment measuring crime seriousness is the pioneering work of Sellin and Wolfgang”); 
Stylianou, supra note 60, at 37 (“The study of perceptions of crime seriousness was introduced 
by Sellin and Wolfgang.”). 
 64 THORSTEN SELLIN & MARVIN E. WOLFGANG, THE MEASUREMENT OF DELINQUENCY 1 
(1964). 
 65 Id. at 6. 
 66 Id. at 241–58. 
 67 See generally, e.g., Monica A. Walker, Measuring the Seriousness of Crimes, 18 BRIT. 
J. CRIMINOLOGY 348 (1978) (extending Sellin & Wolfgang’s work to a general population 
sample and confirming consistency of results across multiple methods); Peter H. Rossi et al., 
supra note 63, at 224 (surveying households in Baltimore to obtain ratings of a set of 140 
crimes). 
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The first of these questions is fundamental—if we do not know what we 
mean by seriousness, how can we expect to measure it?  We could define it 
as a partial order on punishment: one crime is more serious than another if 
and only if it should be punished more harshly.  Some hope for an additive 
property, such that a crime that is twice as serious as another should receive 
twice as harsh a penalty.  This question of additivity is a significant issue. 
Sellin and Wolfgang’s effort to create an additive scale is one of the reasons 
their work is considered seminal. 
Several researchers have studied the components or dimensions of 
seriousness.  Mark Warr identified two dimensions: the moral wrongfulness 
of the crime and the harmfulness of the offense’s consequences.68 He asked 
Dallas residents to rate the seriousness, wrongfulness, and harmfulness of 31 
crimes.  His results were mixed. Among some respondents, different 
dimensions predominated for different classes of crimes (e.g., property 
crimes versus public order crimes) and wrongfulness and harmfulness were 
good predictors of seriousness.69  Other respondents appeared to ignore moral 
wrongfulness entirely, judging crimes solely on the harm done.70 
Warr’s decomposition was relatively simple. Others have proposed 
more dimensions.  Mark Hansel, for example, analyzed seriousness along 
nine dimensions: actual harm, potential harm, harmfulness to the offender, 
the “sickness” of the offense, the extent to which the offense is “personal,” 
and whether the offense is property-related, violent, immoral, or sex-
related.71  Stephen Blum-West looked at eight dimensions: bodily harm, 
economic damage, emotional damage, potential for harm, intent, purpose, 
motive, and fair play.72 
Measurements of the components of seriousness naturally lead into 
questions of other factors that might affect perceptions.  In contrast to studies 
such as Sellin and Wolfgang’s, which attempt to rank a broad range of 
crimes, these studies are primarily concerned with how perceptions are 
affected by characteristics of the offenders, victims, and crime 
circumstances.  Thus, while the Sellin and Wolfgang study and its direct 
 
 68 Mark Warr, What is the Perceived Seriousness of Crimes?, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 795, 796 
(1989). Sean Rosenmerkel replicated this work several years later, focusing on white-collar 
crimes. See Sean Rosenmerkel, Wrongfulness and Harmfulness as Components of Seriousness 
of White-Collar Offenses, 17 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 308, 313 (2001). 
 69 Warr, supra note 68, at 802–08. 
 70 Id. at 810–15. 
 71 Mark Hansel, Citizen Crime Stereotypes—Normative Consensus Revisited, 25 
CRIMINOLOGY 455, 460 (1987). 
 72 Stephen Blum-West, The Seriousness of Crime: A Study of Popular Morality, 6 
DEVIANT BEHAV. 83 (1985). 
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progeny asked respondents to rate a relatively large number of short and 
general crime descriptions, studies of crime factors sometimes present fewer 
but longer and more detailed scenarios. 
Although some crime factor studies have presented respondents with a 
single scenario73—and indeed we use a similar approach in one of our 
studies—it is also common to ask respondents to rate multiple scenarios.  One 
technique is the factorial vignette survey experiment, which has been used to 
study normative and positive judgments.74  In this kind of experiment, 
respondents rate a series of short paragraph-length vignettes.  Each describes 
the same basic scenario, but with different details.  For example, a study of 
perceptions of just punishments for street crimes might use a template 
describing a robbery; each vignette would describe a version that differs in 
details such as the offender’s and victim’s age, race, gender, and whether a 
dangerous weapon was used.  If the values (or “levels”) for each of the 
variables (“factors” or “dimensions”) are randomly generated, the factorial 
survey has many of the features of a fully randomized experiment—a 
regression analysis based on ordinary least squares (OLS) is expected to 
generate unbiased coefficients.75  And although the total number of 
combinations of factors and levels (the “vignette space”) may be very large, 
the response set is also large because each respondent rates several 
vignettes.76 
Rossi, Simpson, and Miller were among the first to apply the factorial 
vignette methodology to perceptions of crime seriousness.77  They presented 
774 respondents with 50 vignettes describing a crime for which a person had 
been convicted.  The vignettes varied over 20 dimensions, including 57 crime 
descriptions, 7 amounts of money stolen, 4 degrees of previous violations, 8 
ranges for the age of the offender, and so on.  They used a computer program 
to print booklets of 50 vignettes each that respondents rated on paper.  The 
 
 73 See, e.g., Mary Dodge et al., Do Men and Women Perceive White-Collar and Street 
Crime Differently? Exploring Gender Differences in the Perception of Seriousness, Motives, 
and Punishment, 29 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 399, 403 (2013). 
 74 See KATRIN AUSPURG & THOMAS HINZ, FACTORIAL SURVEY EXPERIMENTS 13–15 
(2015); Guillermina Jasso, Factorial Methods for Studying Beliefs and Judgments, 34 SOC. 
METHODS & RES. 334, at 338–39; Rossi et al., Beyond Crime Seriousness: Fitting the 
Punishment to the Crime, 1 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 59, 62. 
 75 See Rossi et al., supra note 9, at 68–69. 
 76 See id. For example, Rossi, Simpson, and Miller’s 1985 study used 20 dimensions with 
3 to 57 levels each for a vignette space of over one trillion unique vignettes (experts in factorial 
vignette methodology would almost certainly say today that 20 dimensions is far too many to 
expect respondents to keep track of). But because 774 respondents rated 50 vignettes each, 
Rossi and his colleagues had over 53,000 vignette ratings in their answer set—more than 
enough to estimate coefficients for each individual dimension. 
 77 Id. at 62. 
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rating task was to mark an unnumbered line answering “The sentence given 
was . . .” with anchors for “much too low,” “low,” “about right,” “high,” and 
“much too high.”  Their analysis showed that perceptions of a crime are 
affected by characteristics of the crime, its consequences, the offender, and 
the people making the judgments. 
One of the questions raised by research into seriousness is the extent to 
which people agree in their judgments.  Blumstein and Cohen studied 
consensus in a 1980 study.78  They asked residents of western Pennsylvania 
to assign sentences to 23 crimes and compared their recommendations to 
actual sentences.  Respondents tended to agree on the relative severity of 
crimes but disagreed over the appropriate magnitude of punishment.  They 
also tended to recommend more severe punishments than those actually 
imposed by courts.  Rossi, Simpson, and Miller tackled consensus in their 
paper,79 and Guillermina Jasso discusses it in depth in the context of 
measuring judgments using factorial vignette surveys.80 
Other work in studying crime seriousness has focused on particular 
types of crime.  For example, criminologists have studied perceptions of 
white–collar crimes,81 environmental crimes,82 and “small” crimes.83  White–
collar crimes are generally seen as less serious but their perceived seriousness 
appears to have increased over the years since Wolfgang and Sellin’s 1964 
study.84  Although white–collar crimes may be similar to computer crimes, 
to our knowledge no one has analyzed how the features of cybercrimes affect 
perceptions. 
 
 78 Alfred Blumstein & Jacqueline Cohen, Sentencing of Convicted Offenders: An Analysis 
of the Public’s View, 14 L. & SOC. REV. 223, 248–52 (1980). 
 79 Rossi et al., supra note 9, at 81–89. 
 80 See Jasso, supra note 74, at 388–403. 
 81 See generally, e.g., Francis T. Cullen et al., The Seriousness of Crime Revisited: Have 
Attitudes Toward White-Collar Crime Changed?, 20 CRIMINOLOGY 83 (1982) (studying 
whether perceptions of white-collar crime had changed since 1972 more than perceptions of 
other kinds of crime); Dodge et al., supra note 73 (studying perceptions of white-collar crimes 
versus street crimes with a focus on gender); Sean Rosenmerkel, Wrongfulness and 
Harmfulness as Components of Seriousness of White-Collar Offenses, 17 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. 
JUST. 308 (2001) (studying perceptions of white-collar offenses as compared to property 
offenses and violent offenses). 
 82 See generally Tara O’Connor Shelley et al., What About the Environment? Assessing 
the Perceived Seriousness of Environmental Crime, 35 INT’L J. COMP. & APPLIED CRIM. JUST. 
307 (2011) (studying whether the public perceives environmental crimes to be serious crimes). 
 83 See generally Salima Douhou et al., The Perception of Small Crimes, 27 EUR. J. POL. 
ECON. 749 (2011) (studying perceptions of “small crimes” such as littering, cheating on taxes, 
and speeding). 
 84 See Cullen et al., supra note 81, at 83, 92–94; Dodge et al., supra note 73, at 412 (2013). 
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III. STUDY I: BETWEEN-SUBJECTS EXPERIMENTS 
To understand how features of cybercrimes affect individuals’ 
perceptions, we conducted two human-subjects studies whose methodologies 
complement each other (see Introduction).  Study I consists of six between-
subjects experiments and is discussed in this Section.  Study II is a factorial 
vignette survey experiment and is discussed in Part IV. 
A. METHODOLOGY 
1. Research Questions 
We designed six between-subjects experiments, randomly assigning 
each subject to one experimental condition. In each experiment, we 
manipulated different features of a crime, one at a time.  Each experiment 
relied on the presentation of a vignette describing an intentional data breach 
of consumers’ personal information.  We chose this vignette for a number of 
reasons.  The data-breach scenario is a common one that we believe is readily 
understandable by most people.85  It also lends itself to manipulation of the 
attributes of interest (scope, context, motivation, etc.) while holding other 
attributes reasonably constant. 
We focus on six aspects of cybercrime likely to influence perceptions 
of wrongfulness or harmfulness.  Five of them are, as discussed in Part A, 
directly relevant to sentencing: (1) scope, (2) motivation, (3) consequences, 
(4) context, and (5) the type of data affected. We also investigate (6) the 
breached organization’s co-responsibility, to learn whether people perceive 
a crime to be less serious when it was facilitated by an organization’s poor 
security practices. 
To study perceptions of these aspects, we use the following informal 
hypotheses: 
 
H1: Theft of medical data is seen as more wrongful and more harmful 
than the theft of name and address data. 
H2: Perceptions of crime harmfulness and severity increase with the 
number of records downloaded in a data breach. 
H3: A cybercrime committed by someone with a profit motive is seen 
as more wrongful than one committed by a political activist or a 
person curious about security vulnerabilities. 
 
 85 See Data Breaches, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.privacyrights.org/ 
data-breach [http://perma.cc/U4LW-PEE8] (last visited Aug. 31, 2018) (stating that over 11 
billion data records have been affected in over 8,000 data breaches since 2005). 
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H4a: A cybercrime with more expensive consequences is seen as more 
harmful, but not necessarily more wrongful, than cybercrimes 
causing less damage. 
H4b: People perceive cybercrimes as worse when large losses fall on 
consumers rather than on businesses. 
H5: An organization that had not patched its servers when it was 
breached is perceived as more co-responsible for the crime than 
an organization that had patched its servers. 
H6: Downloading data from a bank or government agency is 
perceived as more wrongful and harmful than downloading the 
same data from a non-profit. 
 
Each of the hypotheses listed above is ceteris paribus—that is, we 
assume that all factors not in the manipulation are held equal. 
2. Design 
Study I consisted of six between-subjects online survey experiments. 
Within each experiment, we randomly assigned participants to one of the 
conditions.  Depending on the experiment, the number of conditions ranged 
from two to five.  The six experiments manipulated the six aspects already 
discussed: type of data, scope, motivation, consequences, co-responsibility, 
and context. 
One of the challenges was to manipulate only one attribute at a time.  
We were therefore careful to choose vignette language that minimized the 
possibility that a manipulation of one variable would “spill over” into an 
effect on consequences, which might dominate other manipulations.  At the 
same time, vignettes had to be believable.  We tackled these issues by 
specifying consequences whenever possible and by stating in the vignette 
that the perpetrator of the data breach in our scenario did not release the data 
he downloaded.  This had the desirable side effect of limiting extreme 
“ceiling” effects in the responses to our questions.  Because the consequences 
were minimalized, the answers in each vignette were better distributed across 
the range than they otherwise might have been. 
All between-subjects experiments (and their conditions) followed the 
same structure.  Participants who passed a screening process received an 
online survey.  The survey asked them to read a vignette similar to the 
following: 
On June 3, 2013, while browsing the Internet, Tom Smith discovered 
a security flaw in the Acme Insurance Company’s website. He used 
that flaw to gain access to Acme’s internal network and download 
100,000 records from Acme’s customer database. Each record 
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consisted of a customer’s full name, phone number, and address. 
Tom did not use or release the information. Acme’s customers 
suffered no harm. 
Each experiment modified or extended this vignette with a particular 
manipulation.  In the “Type of Data” experiment, the survey described the 
data obtained in the breach as either names, phone numbers, and addresses; 
or names, health history, medical diagnoses, and prescription records.  The 
“Scope” experiment described the number of records downloaded as 10, 100, 
1,000, 10,000, or 1,000,000 records depending on condition.  In the 
“Motivation” experiment, the vignette included text explaining why Tom 
Smith was looking for security flaws—he was trying to make money, was a 
student looking to learn about computer security, or was an activist looking 
for evidence of corporate corruption.  The “Consequences” experiment 
included three conditions: either Acme spent $1000 to secure its servers, 
Acme spent $5 million to repair damage to its database, or Acme’s customers 
suffered a collective $5 million in identity theft.  In the “Co-Responsibility” 
experiment, Acme had either patched its servers or not.  In the “Context” 
experiment, the organization from which Tom Smith downloaded the data 
was described as a bank, a non-profit organization, or a government agency. 
After they read the vignette, participants saw a series of multiple-choice 
questions intended to test their recall of the details.  Each experiment 
included questions to test recollection of the vignette’s data type, context, 
and scope.  If these three questions did not include the manipulated variable, 
we added an additional question to check recall of the manipulation.  After 
each memory-check question, the survey showed each participant a page 
indicating whether his or her answer was correct and repeating the correct 
answer to further reinforce the participant’s awareness of the details. 
The survey then collected the variables of interest.  Participants were 
asked to answer a series of questions on a 1–7 Likert scale.  We selected the 
first three questions in accordance with previous research on the factors of 
crime seriousness.86  The survey presented the following questions in random 
order: 
“How wrongful were Tom Smith’s actions?” 
“How serious was the crime Tom Smith committed?” 
“How harshly should Tom Smith be punished?” 
“How harmful were Tom Smith’s actions?” 
“How responsible was the Acme Insurance Company for the crime?”87 
“How clever was Mr. Tom Smith?” 
 
 86 See, e.g., Warr, supra note 68, at 796. 
 87 In the Context experiment, the “Acme Insurance Company” was replaced by “ACR.” 
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“How sensitive were the data that Tom Smith downloaded?” 
 
The survey also asked participants to recommend a specific punishment 
for the crime.  The question was multiple–choice, with eleven options 
ranging from no punishment at all on the low end, to probation, to a sentence 
of 0–30 days, all the way to a sentence of life in prison on the high end, with 
intermediate sentence lengths in between. 
In the Motivation, Consequences, Co-Responsibility, and Context 
experiments, the survey followed the specific-punishment question with a 
question about the potential consequences of Tom Smith’s actions.  This 
question was intended to help determine whether participants judged 
scenarios by potential consequences instead of the actual consequences 
described in the scenarios.  The added question also made another attention 
check possible: participants who rated the potential consequences as lower 
than the actual consequences may not have been paying enough attention to 
the questions.  We removed these responses from the response set. 
The next section included several questions intended to measure 
participants’ attitudes and experiences about data protection and personal 
privacy.  We used the fifteen-question Concern for Information Privacy 
(CFIP) scale.88  We also asked how often participants had suffered identity 
theft, how often they provide fake information when registering for web sites, 
and how much they had heard or read about “use and potential misuse of 
information collected from the Internet” in the past year.  The survey 
instrument concluded with demographic questions and a few open-ended 
questions. 
We ran ordered probit regressions on each variable of interest. 
Regressions included controls for demographics, memory check correctness, 
and privacy attitudes.  We treated the demographic variables for gender, 
country of birth, age, education, occupation, work situation, and the memory 
check variables as categorical variables.  We treated as continuous variables 
(1) the extent to which participants had been affected by cybercrime or 
privacy invasions and (2) the extents to which they use fake personal 
information and are aware of media coverage of data misuse. 
 
 88 See generally H. Jeff Smith et al., Information Privacy: Measuring Individuals’ 
Concerns About Organizational Practices, 20 MIS Q. 167 (1996) (describing the development 
and test of an instrument for measuring individuals’ levels of privacy concern). 
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B. THEORETICAL MODEL 
For each experiment, we model a belief function of the form 
𝑌 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋 + ∑ 𝛾𝑞𝑍𝑞 + 𝜀 
where each 𝑌is a judgment about the crime, 𝑋 is an attribute of that crime, 
𝛾𝑞𝑍𝑞 are attributes of the respondents 𝑞 and their coefficients, and 𝜀 is the 
error term (which encompasses attributes of the crime other than 𝑋). 
Our model thus predicts a collective belief function with shared (or 
aggregate) intercept and slope.  Although this is an overly simplistic model, 
it offers flexibility in evaluating multiple judgments. 
C. RESULTS 
For each experiment, we used Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to 
recruit participants 18 years of age or older who lived in the United States, 
had at least a 95% approval rating on MTurk, and had not previously 
participated in any of the studies described in this article.  The demographics 
and data quality of MTurk experiments have been extensively studied in 
multiple experimental contexts.89  Several studies have shown that 
recruitment for online studies through MTurk can lead to more representative 
samples and better data quality than studies using other “convenience” 
 
 89 See generally, e.g., Michael Buhrmester et al., Amazon’s Mechanical Turk: A New 
Source of Inexpensive, Yet High-Quality Data?, 6 PERSP. PSYCH. SCI. 3, 3 (2011) (finding the 
data obtained with MTurk samples to be “at least as reliable as those obtained via traditional 
methods”); Matthew J.C. Crump et al., Evaluating Amazon’s Mechanical Turk as a Tool for 
Experimental Behavioral Research, 8:3 PLOS ONE 1 (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/ 
journal.pone.0057410 [http://perma.cc/5ZJ2-K4T5] (replicating several tasks from 
experimental psychology using MTurk and finding that most were “qualitatively successful”); 
Joseph K. Goodman et al., Data Collection in a Flat World: The Strengths and Weaknesses of 
Mechanical Turk Samples, 26 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 213, 213 (2013) (finding that, 
despite “many similarities between MTurk participants and traditional samples,” MTurk 
participants could be less attentive and have lower self-esteem); Winter Mason & Siddharth 
Suri, Conducting Behavioral Research on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, 44 BEHAV. RES. 
METHODS 1 (2012) (describing MTurk and discussing issues with MTurk research); Gabriele 
Paolacci et al., Running Experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION 
MAKING 411 (2010) (reviewing MTurk and comparing it to other subject pools); Joel Ross et 
al., Who Are the Crowdworkers? Shifting Demographics in Mechanical Turk, in CHI ‘10 
EXTENDED ABSTRACTS HUM. FACTORS COMPUTING SYS. 2863 (2010) (describing how MTurk 
worker demographics have changed); Daniel J. Simons & Christopher F. Chabris, Common 
(Mis)Beliefs about Memory: A Replication and Comparison of Telephone and Mechanical 
Turk Survey Methods, 7:12 PLOS ONE 1 (Dec. 18, 2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/ 
journal.pone.0051876 [http://perma.cc/C5EY-DJXK] (using MTurk to replicate a telephone 
survey). 
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samples such as university students.90  Peer and his co-authors found that 
reputation alone is often enough to ensure sufficient data quality in MTurk 
studies.91  Another study showed that MTurkers paid more attention to 
instructions than did traditional subject pool samples.92 
Our MTurk job description asked people to take “a short survey on 
crime.”  We recruited a total of 2,635 participants in October through 
December 2013.  We screened potential participants to exclude anyone who 
had participated in our crime seriousness experiments from participating in 
subsequent experiments in this series.  We also filtered out responses with 
duplicated IP addresses or MTurk IDs, that claimed that the participant was 
under 18 years old or resided outside the U.S., or that contained contradictory 
answers rating the vignette’s potential consequences as greater than the 
actual consequences. 
The remaining data set consists of 2,440 responses across six 
experiments.  In each experiment the median age category is 25–34. 
Responses from females range from 41% to 52% of responses in each study.  
The only statistically significant difference across conditions in terms of age, 
gender, education, occupation, or work situation is (1) in the Motivation 
experiment, in which occupation differs at p < 0.05 and work situation differs 
at one-sided p < 0.05; and (2) the Context experiment, in which work 
situation differs between conditions at p < 0.05.  We account for these 
variables (and all other demographic variables) in our regressions. 
 
 90 See Tara S. Behrend et al., The Viability of Crowdsourcing for Survey Research, 43 
BEHAV. RES. METHODS 800, 810–11 (2011); Adam J. Berinsky et al., Evaluating Online Labor 
Markets for Experimental Research: Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, 20 POL. ANALYSIS 351, 366 
(2012) (concluding that “despite possible self-selection concerns, the MTurk subject pool is 
no worse than convenience samples used by other researchers in political science”); Krista 
Casler et al., Separate but Equal? A Comparison of Participants and Data Gathered via 
Amazon’s MTurk, Social Media, and Face-to-Face Behavioral Testing, 29 COMPUTERS HUM. 
BEHAV. 2156, 2158–59 (2013). 
 91 Eyal Peer et al., Reputation as a Sufficient Condition for Data Quality in Amazon 
Mechanical Turk, 46 BEHAV. RES. METHODS 1023, 1030–31 (2014). 
 92 David J. Hauser & Norbert Schwarz, Attentive Turkers: MTurk Participants Perform 
Better on Online Attention Checks than Do Subject Pool Participants, 48 BEHAV. RES. 
METHODS 400, 405 (2016). 
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Table 2 shows the coefficients and standard errors for the eight variables 
of interest in all six experiments.  The results of these experiments lead to the 
following conclusions for each of our hypotheses: 
 
H1: Theft of medical data is seen as more wrongful and more harmful 
than the theft of name and address data. 
 
As expected, participants rated names, health histories, medical 
diagnoses, and prescription records as more sensitive than names, phone 
numbers, and addresses (p < 0.001).  The effect is strong as well as 
significant: 72% of participants in the medical-data condition rated the data 
as 7 (“Extremely sensitive”) or 6 compared to 34% of those in the directory-
data condition. 
Perceived crime severity, however, were not statistically significantly 
different.  Answers to “How sensitive was the data?” and “How serious was 
the crime?” are strongly correlated (p < 0.001, χ2) but the difference in 
perceptions of data sensitivity by condition does not translate to a statistically 
significant difference in perceptions of crime severity. 
 
Table 2: Summary of Regression Results in Between-Subjects Experiments 
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H2: Perceptions of crime harmfulness and severity increase with the 
number of records downloaded in a data breach. 
 
The number of records had a statistically significant effect in the 
expected direction on all the Likert-type question responses.  Note, however, 
that this may be due in part to the large sample size compared to our other 
experiments.  Although we kept the number of participants per condition 
about the same as in other experiments, the total number makes it more likely 
that small-magnitude results such as those seen for Acme’s co-responsibility 
for the breach (?̂? = 0.064, se = 0.026, p < 0.05) and Tom’s cleverness 
(?̂? = 0.057, se = 0.025, p < 0.05) will be statistically significant. 
Interestingly, participants rated the data as more sensitive when more 
records were affected.  The magnitude of that effect (?̂? = 0.135) is larger than 
that for any of the seven Likert questions except for seriousness (?̂? = 0.159). 
Interpreting this result is challenging without additional information, but two 
possible explanations seem plausible.  First, the survey experiment may not 
have done an adequate job of asking about the sensitivity of the type of data 
downloaded as opposed to the sensitivity of the entire set of actual data 
records downloaded.  Second, people may have conflated data sensitivity and 
the total potential for harm from the amount of data. 
 
H3: A cybercrime committed by someone with a profit motive is seen as 
more wrongful than one committed by a political activist or a 
person curious about security vulnerabilities. 
 
Participants judged the profiteer’s crime as more serious than the same 
crime committed by a student or activist.  There was virtually no statistically 
significant difference in perceptions of the student and the activist, however. 
Participants rated the profiteer’s crime as more wrongful (p < 0.001), harmful 
(p < 0.05), and serious (p < 0.001) than the student’s, and said that the crime 
should be punished more harshly (p < 0.001).  The difference between the 
profiteer and activist was only slightly less pronounced, with strongly 
significant results for both wrongfulness (p < 0.001) and seriousness 
(p < 0.001), and with one-sided significance for harmfulness (p < 0.05).  The 
profiteer also received harsher judgments, compared with the activist, of how 
harshly he should be punished (p < 0.01).  And although participants said that 
the activist should be punished more harshly than the student (p < 0.05), 
perceptions of wrongfulness, harmfulness, and seriousness were statistically 
indistinguishable. 
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H4a: A cybercrime with more expensive consequences is seen as more 
harmful, but not necessarily more wrongful, than cybercrimes 
causing less damage. 
 
The manipulation had the expected effect on perceptions of 
harmfulness.  The conditions in which either Acme (p < 0.001) or its 
customers (p < 0.01) spent $5 million received higher ratings of harmfulness 
than the condition in which the only cost was $1,000 to secure servers (the 
“Low” condition).  Participants also said that each of these two cases should 
be punished more harshly than the Low condition (Acme: p < 0.01, 
Customers: p < 0.05).  Although participants perceived the crimes involving 
$5 million loss to be more harmful than the Low condition, these crimes were 
not perceived as more wrongful or serious with statistical significance 
(although the coefficients are in the expected direction). 
 
H4b: People perceive cybercrimes as worse when large losses fall on 
consumers rather than on businesses. 
 
Whether Acme or its customers bore the costs made little difference.  
Not only were the responses to the main Likert questions not statistically 
significant between the Acme High and Customer High conditions, the 
harmfulness of each condition was virtually the same (?̂? = 0.03, se = 0.122).  
This is somewhat surprising.  We had expected that participants would 
empathize with customers over companies and that empathy would lead to 
ratings of damage to customers as more harmful than the same amount of 
damage to Acme.  But this does not seem to have been the case. It could be 
that people are more sympathetic to customers than companies, as we would 
expect, but that the two conditions are not as similar as we had hoped.  
$5 million in costs to a single company are not the same as $5 million in costs 
spread among 100,000 people. 
 
H5: An organization that had not patched its servers when it was 
breached is perceived as more co-responsible for the crime than 
an organization that had patched its servers. 
 
The manipulation of whether Acme patched its servers had the expected 
effect on perceptions of the company’s partial responsibility for the crime.  
Participants found Acme more responsible for the crime when it had not 
patched its servers (p < 0.01).  Participants did not find the crime significantly 
more wrongful, harmful, or serious in this case, suggesting that they 
distinguished between the seriousness of a crime and its causes. 
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Surprisingly, participants also rated the data as less sensitive when 
Acme had not patched its servers.  Some people may have assumed that the 
data was poorly protected because it was less sensitive. 
 
H6: Downloading data from a bank or government agency is perceived 
as more wrongful and harmful than downloading the same data 
from a non-profit. 
 
The context manipulation showed no two-sided statistically significant 
effects on any of the main Likert questions except for how partially 
responsible the breached organization was.  Participants judged the non-
profit to be less responsible for the breach than they did the bank (p < 0.01) 
or the government agency (p < 0.001).  Participants did rate the non-profit 
vignette as less serious than either the government or bank scenario with one-
sided p < 0.05. 
 
For the most part, Study I showed effects in the directions expected.  
Changing the data from directory information to health information increased 
perceived sensitivity.  Increasing the number of records generally increased 
how wrongful, harmful, and serious the crime was seen.  Interestingly, 
increasing the number of records also increased perceptions of how sensitive 
the data was.  Cybercrime committed with a profit motive was rated as more 
wrongful than the same crime motivated by activism or a desire to learn.  
Respondents perceived an organization that had patched its servers to be less 
responsible for the crime than an organization that had not.  The more costly 
a breach’s consequences, the more harmful it was rated.  Participants rated 
downloading data from banks and government agencies (and, in the factorial 
experiment, insurers) as more serious than downloading data from a non-
profit. 
Data sensitivity did not, however, appear to be a major component of 
seriousness.  Despite the data sensitivity in Experiment 1 having the strongest 
effect of any manipulation, the perceived harmfulness, wrongfulness, and 
seriousness of the crime was not statistically significant across conditions. 
The results of Study I support interpretations of seriousness as having 
components of both wrongfulness and harmfulness.  Cybercrime vignettes 
that were rated as more wrongful were rated, with high significance, as more 
serious.  So were vignettes that were rated as more harmful. 
One of the more interesting results is the comparative reaction of our 
participants to cybercrimes committed by activists versus cybercrimes 
committed for profit.  The former were considered significantly less 
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blameworthy, and deserving significantly lighter sentences—contrary to the 
position sometimes taken by U.S. prosecutors.  
Table 3 shows pairwise correlations between each dependent variable 
across all six between-subjects experiments in Study I.93  Wrongfulness, 
harmfulness, seriousness, and how harshly the crime should be punished are 
all positively correlated.  The correlations between wrongfulness, 
harmfulness, and seriousness confirm previous work suggesting that the first 
two measures are components of the third.94  The correlation between 
seriousness and how harshly the crime should be punished confirms that 
people want crimes that are more serious to be punished more harshly.  Also 
unsurprising is the positive correlation between potential harm and measures 
of wrongfulness, harmfulness, seriousness, and punishment. 
More interestingly, our results show a statistically significant positive 
correlation between perceived data sensitivity and ratings of the 
wrongfulness, harmfulness, seriousness, and harshness of punishment for 
crimes.  This seems at odds with our results in the type-of-data experiment, 
which shows no significant effect on perceptions between medical data and 
directory data even though respondents rated the former as more sensitive 
than the latter.  But the correlations are consistent with the results from the 
factorial experiment, as will be discussed in the next section. 
As a final note on the correlation table, there are some statistically 
significant correlations involving how responsible ACR was for the crime 
and, separately, how clever the offender was. But the magnitudes of these 
correlations are tiny. 
 
 93 Correlation matrices for each study do not differ meaningfully from the aggregate. 
 94 See Warr, supra note 68, at 818–20. 
Table 3: Pairwise correlation matrix for the DVs in the between-subjects 
experiments 
 
Notes: The table shows pairwise correlations for the DVs across all six between-studies 
experiments. N=2440 for all pairings except those involving Pot. Harmful, for which 
N=1618. 
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IV. STUDY II: FACTORIAL VIGNETTE SURVEY EXPERIMENT 
We followed the between-subjects experiments with an experiment 
using factorial vignette survey methodology.  As discussed in Part B, 
factorial vignette surveys are commonly used to study beliefs and normative 
judgments.95  In this methodology, each participant rates a number of 
vignettes describing a scenario. The details of the scenario vary from vignette 
to vignette.  In the parlance of factorial vignette methodology, the variables 
are known as “dimensions” and the possible values of those variables are 
called “levels.” 
We decided to supplement our between-subjects experiments with a 
factorial vignette survey experiment for several reasons.  First, the factorial 
vignette methodology gives a better method of directly comparing the effects 
of different factors of a cybercrime.  For example, we might want to know 
whether the scope or context of a cybercrime contributes more to perceptions 
of the seriousness of that crime.  Because our between-subjects experiments 
were conducted at different times and, as between some experiments, with 
slightly different vignette texts, comparisons within a single experiment have 
more validity than those across the multiple experiments of Study I.96 
Second, because participants in a factorial vignette survey experiment 
each rate multiple vignettes, the factorial vignette methodology allows us to 
account for effects within subjects in addition to the between-subjects 
analysis.  However, because the number of vignettes each participant rates 
must be kept reasonably small (twenty-five, in our case) to avoid fatigue, the 
statistical power of this analysis is limited. 
Third, the different methodology lets us test the robustness of our results 
from the between-subjects experiments, obtain a larger sample size from a 
smaller number of participants (and thus gain greater statistical power 
without an accordant increase in cost), and refine some of the details of the 
rating task we asked participants to do. 
Finally, the factorial vignette survey is a known methodology that has 
been used already in the literature on crime seriousness.97 
 
 95 See KATRIN AUSPURG & THOMAS HINZ, FACTORIAL SURVEY EXPERIMENTS 13–15 
(2015); Jasso, supra note 74, at 338–39; Rossi et al., supra note 9, at 62. 
 96 See, e.g., Paul D. Allison, Comparing Logit and Probit Coefficients Across Groups, 28 
SOC. METHODS & RES. 186 (1999); Carina Mood, Logistic Regression: Why We Cannot Do 
What We Think We Can Do, and What We Can Do About It, 26 EUR. SOC. REV. 67 (2010). 
 97 See generally, e.g., KATRIN AUSPURG & THOMAS HINZ, FACTORIAL SURVEY 
EXPERIMENTS 14 (2015); Larry A. Hembroff, The Seriousness of Acts and Social Contexts: A 
Test of Black’s Theory of the Behavior of Law, 93 AM. J. SOC. 322 (1987) (using the factorial 
methodology to study judgments of stabbing and theft scenarios); Jasso, supra note 74 (using 
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A. METHODOLOGY 
1. Research Questions 
Our research questions are driven by the goals listed in Section 1.  In 
terms of relative effect sizes, the results of the between-subjects surveys 
suggest that motivation—specifically, that of a profiteer versus a student or 
activist—is the largest factor in perceptions of cybercrime seriousness, 
followed by a crime’s consequences and scope.  We conjectured that the 
same would be true when all were manipulated in the same study. 
2. Design 
The design for this study consisted of a factorial vignette survey 
experiment.  We presented each participant with twenty-five vignettes 
describing a cybercrime scenario.98  Each was structured as a paragraph 
describing the facts followed by a list of the factors that varied from one 
vignette to another.99  The survey was similar in format to the between-
subjects experiments, with some adjustments because participants would be 
asked to rate multiple vignettes. 
The vignettes were of the following form: 
Tom Smith is a computer programmer who looks for security flaws 
on the Internet. On September 3, 2014, Tom found a security flaw in 
the website of an organization named ACR and used that flaw to 
download records from ACR’s customer database. He anonymously 
released details about the flaw to the Internet, but did not use or 
release the records he downloaded. Before he did this, Tom had 
never been arrested or convicted of any crime. 
ACR was $org. 
Tom downloaded $records customer records. 
Each record consisted of a customer’s $data. 
Tom’s motivation was to $motive. 
ACR spent $org_loss to repair and secure its servers. 
 
the factorial survey methodology to study perceptions of five types of crimes); Rossi et al., 
supra note 9 (using the factorial survey methodology to study perceptions of fifty crimes). 
 98 We would have preferred to present 40 vignettes per respondent, but a pilot study with 
that many vignettes showed signs of respondent fatigue, such as high dropout rates, and 
technical issues in the survey software. We therefore scaled back to 25 vignettes. 
 99 Adopting a variation of Jasso’s terminology, we refer to the common story described in 
the vignettes as the “scenario,” a particular combination of that scenario with assigned values 
for each factor as a “vignette,” and the set of all vignettes that could be generated by the 
random selection of factor levels as the “vignette population.” See Jasso, supra note 74, at 
340–41 (2006). 
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Its customers spent $cust_loss each to protect themselves from 
identity fraud. 
Tom was convicted of the crime and received a sentence of $sentence 
$sent_type. 
 
We selected the values each variable could take to be the same as those 
used in the between-subjects experiments where possible.  The values for 
each variable were: 
 
$org: “a bank,” “a non-profit organization,” “an insurance company,” 
“a government agency” 
$records: 10, 100, 1,000, 10,000, or 100,000 
$data: “e-mail address,” “full name, phone number, and address,” “full 
name, address, and social security number,” “full name, health 
history, medical diagnoses, and prescription records,” “full name, 
phone number, address, date of birth, and social security number,” 
“full name, user ID, and password” 
$motive: “learn about Internet security,” “seek evidence of corporate 
corruption,” “make money” 
$org_loss: $1000, $10,000, $100,000, $1,000,000, $10,000,000 
$cust_loss: $10, $50, $100, $250, $500 
$sentence: 3 months, 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 5 years 
$sent_type: “probation,” “in jail” (for sentences less than 1 year) or “in 
prison” (for sentences of one year or more) 
 
The survey software selected the value of each variable randomly and 
independently for each vignette.  Any given vignette therefore represented a 
random sample from the vignette population.  The only exception to that 
independence is that we prevented health data (“full name, health history, 
medical diagnoses, and prescription records”) from being selected as a data 
type when the organization type was a bank because participants might find 
it implausible that a bank would be holding health data in its database.  We 
did not prevent other combinations that some participants might have found 
implausible, such as an organization suffering $10 million in losses from the 
breach of 10 e-mail addresses (a combination that occurred 29 times in our 
data set).  Treating the numerical factors $records, $org_loss, $cust_loss, and 
$sentence as continuous, the vignette population consisted of 138 vignettes.  
If the continuous variables were treated as categorical, the vignette 
population would contain 86,250 vignettes. 
At the bottom of each vignette we presented a slider with the rating task 
asking participants to evaluate the sentence imposed.  We limited the rating 
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task to one question because of research showing that undesirable method 
effects increase when participants are asked multiple questions after each 
vignette.100  The slider was anchored at each end with “Much too low” at the 
left and “Much too high” at the right.  We set the marker on the slider to a 
starting position in the middle of the scale.  We left the slider unmarked 
except for the two anchors because of research suggesting that people tend 
to treat tick marks on a scale as “magnets”—a slider with five tick marks 
tends to be treated like a five-point Likert scale, for example.101  Other 
research shows that adding numeric labels to a slider leads to increased 
rounding of responses.102  Figure 1 shows the slider scale that we used. 
We used a slider bar to approximate the real-number scale used in some 
previous factorial vignette surveys.103  The slider widget we used recorded a 
value from 0 to 256, with 0 corresponding to a rating that the sentence was 
“much too low” and 256 corresponding to a sentence that the participant 
believed was “much too high.”  We normalized this to a 0 to 100 scale with 
100 corresponding to a response that the punishment should have been 
higher—i.e., we reversed the scale as presented. We did not round to integer 
values when scaling. 
After the instruction page, the survey presented participants with 
twenty-five vignettes, one per page, followed by the same attitude and 
demographic questions asked in the between-subjects surveys.  Finally, the 
survey presented two open-ended questions: one asking participants what 
 
 100 See Katrin Auspurg & Annette Jäckle, First Equals Most Important? Order Effects in 
Vignette-Based Measurement, INST. SOC. & ECON. RESEARCH Working Paper 2012-01, (Jan. 
18, 2012), https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/research/publications/working-papers/iser/2012-01 
[http://perma.cc/25D9-CYZS]. 
 101 See, e.g., Pete Cape, Slider Scales in Online Surveys, SURVEY SAMPLING INT’L (2009), 
http://www.websm.org/db/12/17947/Web Survey Bibliography/Slider_Scales_in_Online
_Surveys/ [http://perma.cc/U2QT-778U]. 
 102 See, e.g., Mick P. Couper, Roger Tourangeau & Frederick G. Conrad, Evaluating 
Effectiveness of Visual Analog Scales: A Web Experiment, 24 SOC. SCI. COMPUTER REV. 227, 
242 (2006). 
 103 See, e.g., Guillermina Jasso, Exploring the Justice of Punishments: Framing, 
Expressiveness, and the Just Prison Sentence, 11 SOC. JUST. RES. 397, 407–08; Rossi et al., 
supra note 9, at 66–67 (1985). 
 
Figure 1: Factorial instrument rating task slider 
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they thought the study was about and an optional question in which 
participants could enter comments about the study. 
We ran mixed-effects regressions on the rating task, grouping by 
response ID. The regressions included controls for demographics, attention-
check correctness, and privacy attitudes.  As in the between-subjects studies, 
we treated gender, country of birth, age category, education, occupation, 
work situation, and the memory check variables as categorical variables.  We 
treated as continuous variables the extent to which participants had been 
affected by cybercrime or privacy invasions and the extents to which they 
use fake personal information and are aware of media coverage of data 
misuse. 
B. THEORETICAL MODEL 
We use a multi-level model for respondents’ belief function:  
 




where 𝑖 =  1 . . . 𝑛 indexes the vignettes, 𝑗 =  1 . . . 𝑚 indexes the 
respondents, 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑗 are the vignette dimensions (scope, consequences, 
motivation, etc.) and coefficients, 𝛾𝑞𝑍𝑞𝑗 are respondent characteristics 
(gender, age, privacy attitudes, etc.) and coefficients, 𝑢𝑗 is the respondent-
specific error term, and 𝜀𝑖𝑗 is the usual error term.  This model allows for 
individual variation in intercepts and controls for respondent-level 
differences but assumes common slopes across respondents.104  This 
assumption simplifies the model and lets us understand beliefs in the 
aggregate. 
C. RESULTS 
We used MTurk to recruit participants 18 years of age or older who 
lived in the United States, had at least a 95% approval rating on MTurk, and 
had not previously participated in any of the studies described in this article.  
We screened potential participants to exclude anyone who had seen any of 
the between-subjects experiments or their pilots. Of 267 attempts to take the 
survey, there were 241 unique MTurk IDs (MIDs) and 224 completed 
responses.  After removing one response because the participant answered 
 
 104 See Jasso, supra note 74, at 350–51. 
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that her age was under 18, a total of 223 responses remained (47% women; 
median age category 25–34).105 
Table 4 shows the results of the mixed effects regressions on the 100-
point normalized rating task.  The results are robust to exclusion of answers 
from participants who did not answer our attention check question 
correctly.106 
All of the factors show statistically significant effects for at least some 
values.  The strongest effect in terms of magnitude is the difference between 
the student (or activist) and profiteer motivations.  A vignette in which the 
offender’s motive was profit received a rating that was a little more than 10 
points higher on the 100-point scale than the motive for a student or activist. 
The next highest effect is the type of data.  This is somewhat surprising 
because the type of data was not a manipulation that produced statistically 
significant differences in the between-subjects studies.  Of course, much of 
that is because the low-sensitivity data type in the factorial study consists 
only of e-mail addresses instead of names, phone numbers, and addresses as 
in the between-subjects experiment.  But even between the two data types 
used in the between-subjects experiment (name, phone number, and address 
versus health data), there is a statistically significant effect of about β = 4.9 
(p < 0.001, se = 0.97) in the factorial study.  Some of the difference in results 
might be explained by the larger sample size, but the effect sizes in the 
 
 105 The 224 completed responses from 241 participants represent an abandonment rate of 
7.1%. Two workers reported being unable to complete the survey because of technical issues. 
There was also a high retry rate; 17 completions were on a second attempt and 3 were on a 
third attempt. Fourteen people (5.8%) did not complete the survey and did not attempt to retake 
it. Three of them did not reach the first vignette, two stopped after two vignettes, and one 
stopped after four vignettes. Of the remaining eight participants who completed at least five 
vignettes but “abandoned” the survey, six completed at least fifteen questions and two 
completed all 25 questions and the CFIP questions but not the demographic questions. This 
pattern suggests that technical issues may have been responsible for many “abandoned” 
surveys even among MTurkers who did not try to retake the survey. 
 The distribution of responses shows signs of censoring and clustering at the midpoint. 
About 10% of all ratings were at the midpoint of the slider. Another 5% were at the left end 
(“Much too low”) and 3% were at the high end (“much too high”). Respondents who answered 
the attention-check question correctly gravitated to the midpoint and extremes slightly less 
often than those who did not, 17% to 22% (a statistically significant difference at p < 0.001, 
χ2). Censored and clustered responses were not distributed equally among participants. About 
11% of respondents (25) rated 10 or more of the 25 vignettes at the extremes or middle, and 
7% (13) rated at over half of their vignettes that way. One person rated all vignettes either at 
the bottom (20 times) or middle (5 times). 
 106 In a regression excluding incorrect attention check answers, the coefficient for 
log($cust_loss) drops in significance (β = 0.51, p < 0.05, se = 0.21) and the coefficient for 
non-profit as the organization type drops out of significance (β = -1.43, se = 0.84). All other 
coefficients retain their significance (or lack thereof) and have similar values. 
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between-subjects experiments were very small—the coefficients for 
seriousness and harshness of punishment in the type-of-data experiment were 
roughly an order of magnitude lower than those in the motivation experiment, 
for example.  Thus it does not seem likely that effect size alone accounts for 
the difference. 
As in the between-subjects experiments, the scope (number of records) 
and consequences (loss to customers and the breached organization) are 
significant but with small effect magnitudes.  Note, however, that because 
the explanatory variables are log transformed, the effect sizes are not quite 
as tiny as they appear at first glance in the regression table.  Increasing the 
Table 4: Mixed-effects regression for the factorial experiment  
 Betas se 
log(Records) 0.584*** (0.073) 
log(Org Loss) 0.640*** (0.096) 
log(Cust Loss) 0.672*** (0.184) 
Organization (vs. Bank)   
 Government -1.187 (0.755) 
 Non-profit -1.563* (0.795) 
 Insurer -0.846 (0.781) 
Data (vs. E-mail)   
 Name, addr, SSN 10.112*** (1.110) 
 Name, health history, diagnoses, prescriptions 11.104*** (1.149) 
 Name, phone, addr, DOB, SSN 11.723*** (1.176) 
 Name, phone, addr 6.213*** (0.907) 
 Name, user ID, pwd 6.682*** (1.012) 
Motivation (vs. Profiteer)   
 Student -10.445*** (0.941) 
Activist -10.573*** (0.958) 
log(Sentence) -8.729*** (0.458) 
Probation 7.519*** (1.424) 
log(Sentence) $$ Probation 2.449*** (0.545) 
Female 2.642 (1.546) 
US birth 2.188 (2.757) 
CFIP score 0.980 (1.007) 
Freq. aff by cybercrime 0.367 (1.304) 
Media awareness -0.342 (0.515) 
Attn. check 1.307 (1.809) 
_cons 49.567*** (7.448) 
sd(_cons) 10.264*** (0.703) 
sd(Residual) 17.844*** (0.392) 
N 5575  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Notes: The table shows mixed model regression results for responses to the factorial experiment. 
The DV for each regression is the rating of punishment severity normalized to a 100-point scale. 
Higher numbers correspond to beliefs that punishments should be harsher. 
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loss to the breached organization or customers by a factor of ten would 
correspond to an increase of about 1.5 points in the scaled rating.  A tenfold 
increase in the number of records would correspond to an increase of 1.3 
rating points on the 100-point scale according to our results in the main 
model; an increase along the full 10–1,000,000 record range would be 
expected to add about 6.7 points.  This is still a relatively small effect: all 
else being equal, the increase in perceived seriousness from a breach of 
1,000,000 records instead of 10 records is about the same as the difference 
between a breach of names, user IDs, and passwords instead of e-mail 
addresses. 
We found no statistically significant interaction effects.  We also 
checked interactions for other combinations of explanatory variables and 
found no statistically significant interactions. 
V. DISCUSSION 
A. COMPARISON OF RESULTS BETWEEN THE TWO STUDIES 
Although the results from the two studies were mostly similar, some 
interesting differences do appear. 
Data sensitivity did not appear to be a major component of perceived 
cybercrime seriousness in Study I.  But the factorial experiment showed some 
significant effects between broad categories of data types.  Crimes in which 
only e-mail addresses were accessed were rated as deserving of significantly 
less harsh punishments.  The other five data types in the factorial experiment 
showed something of a partitioning. Data involving either health data or 
Social Security Numbers had the largest coefficients.  The middle tier 
includes (1) directory information and (2) usernames and passwords, which 
have roughly the same coefficients.  This is surprising, because phone 
numbers would seem to be less potentially harmful than usernames and 
passwords. 
 But this result may simply be an effect of the length of the data type 
description.  Running the basic model (1) regression from Table 4 with the 
length of the data type string (as a continuous variable) instead of the data 
type categorical variable results in a coefficient for the string length (β = .165, 
se=.015) that is also statistically significant at p < 0.001.  Multiplying this 
coefficient by the number of characters in each data type results in numbers 
that are, with the exception of “Name, address, and SSN,” not far from those 
in model (1) in Table 4.107  Perhaps respondents used the length of the data 
type as a heuristic.  Unfortunately, because the length of our data type 
 
 107 Reading down the column: 7.8, 11.6, 12.4, 5.9, and 5.3. 
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descriptions and the sensitivity of the data listed are not independent, it is 
impossible to disentangle their effects in our results. 
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR SENTENCING POLICY 
The factorial vignette survey experiment showed a marked disparity 
between the effect of a breached organization’s loss on perceptions of crime 
severity and the impact of loss on sentences.  Our main factorial regression 
equation predicts that increasing the organization’s loss from $1,000 to 
$10,000,000 corresponds to a 5.9-point increase in severity rating (on a 
100-point scale).  The same change in dollar amount would lead to a 20-point 
increase in offense level in the 2016 Sentencing Guidelines,108 enough to 
bump the presumptive sentencing range for a first offense with no other 
enhancements from 0–6 months to 63–78 months.109  For comparison, the 
coefficient on $sentence (when $probation = 0) is -8.729, which means the 
modeled decrease in 100-point rating from a 3 month to 5 year sentence 
is -26.15.  In other words, the actual increase in presumptive punishment 
from the increased amount of loss is about three times what respondents in 
our experiment rate as appropriate. 
Motivation was much more important in our results than it is in 
sentencing.  Respondents judged crimes with a profit motive to be much more 
serious than those committed for activism or curiosity.  The coefficient of 
roughly -10.5 in our main regression for the Student and Activist levels of 
motive means that the Profiteer motive increases the rating of a cybercrime 
by about the same amount as more than tripling a prison or jail sentence (a 
factor of 3.3, to be more precise).  That suggests that there could be support 
for increasing a 3-month sentence to 10 months or a 12-month sentence to 40 
months when profit is the motive for the crime (or, alternately, that crimes 
committed for motives other than profit should be discounted by reversing 
those numbers).  That increase in sentence duration would correspond to an 
increase of about 8 to 10 offense levels in the Sentencing Guidelines. 
The type of organization was not a statistically significant factor in 
evaluations of crime seriousness.  This stands in contrast to the CFAA’s 
specific provisions covering financial and government information,110 or 
government computers.111 
 
 108 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1). 
 109 Id. at § 5.A. Note, however, that some sections of the CFAA carry maximum sentences 
of 5 years for a first offense. 
 110 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(A)–(B). 
 111 Id. § 1030(a)(3). 
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Table 5 lists the effect of offense factors on perceptions and sentencing.  
For example, our model predicts that a cybercrime with a loss of $10,000,000 
instead of $1000 would increase perceptions of the seriousness of that crime 
by 8.8 points on the 100-point scale (all other factors held fixed at the mean).  
The recommended sentence, however, would be 91 to 113 months longer 
(though maximum sentences might reduce that). 
To illustrate in more concrete terms the differences between perceptions 
of cybercrime seriousness and how the sentencing guidelines weigh the 
attributes of a cybercrime, consider the hypothetical crime we used in our 
experiments: a person named Tom Smith discovers a security flaw in a 
website and uses that flaw to access a company’s internal network and 
download records containing personal information.  Our experimental results 
show that people perceive a computer crime to be more serious when the data 
is more sensitive, the offender is motivated by financial gain, the amount of 
loss is high, and a large number of records are affected—in roughly that 
order.  If sentencing reflected public perceptions, a crime with these features 
would be punished more harshly than a crime in which these factors are less 
true. 
Suppose our hypothetical Tom’s motivation was to make money, that 
the number of records was 100,000, and that the data contained full names, 
addresses, phone numbers, dates of birth, and social security numbers.  All 
these parameters are the highest values for factors deemed important in our 
experiments. Assume losses by customers were minimal (because Tom did 
not release the data) or cannot be proven and that ACR was a non-profit.  The 
maximum sentence would be five years because the offense was committed 
Table 5: Impact of offense factors on perceptions and sentences 
Factor Range 
Empirical 
effect Sentencing effect 
Records (Scope) 100,000 vs. 10 +8.7 Depends on amount of 
cust. loss 
Org. Loss  $10,000,000 vs. $1000 +8.8 +91–113 months  
Cust. Loss (each) $500 vs. $10  +3.5 Depends on no. of records 
Motivation Profiteer vs. Activist +10.6 5 year max sentence 
Context Bank vs. Non-profit +1.6 5 year max sentence 
Type of Data Name, phone, addr, DOB, 
SSN vs. e-mail 
+11.7 +4–6 months 
Notes: Empirical effect is based on coefficient estimates in the factorial experiment, assuming 
all other factors held fixed. Sentencing effect assumes criminal history category of I, 6 point 
base offense level, and two 2-point enhancements for sophisticated means and use of a special 
skill, for an offense level of 10 and sentencing range of 6–12 months. 
348 GRAVES, ACQUISTI & ANDERSON [Vol. 109 
for purposes of financial gain.112  Also, the value of the records Tom obtained 
may well be worth more than $5000.113  The base offense level under section 
2B1.1 would be 6.114 The enhancements for using special skill115 or 
sophisticated means,116 which seem to be common in CFAA cases, add two 
points each.  Because the data Tom obtained included personal information, 
another two-point enhancement applies.117  If ACR’s only loss is spending 
$1000 to repair and secure its servers, no enhancement for the amount of loss 
applies and the total offense level (assuming no other adjustments apply) is 
12—which corresponds to a presumptive sentencing range of 10 to 16 
months at criminal history category I. 
Now assume a different set of facts from our experiments. In this 
version, Tom was an activist (perceived as less serious than the profiteer, all 
other factors held constant, by 10.5 points on the 100-point scale), he 
downloaded 1,000 records (2.7 points less serious), and the data contained 
only e-mail addresses (11.7 points less serious than the information in the 
facts above).  The maximum sentence is likely one year instead of five: the 
offense was not committed for financial gain and the value of 1,000 e-mail 
addresses is far less than $5,000,118 so the higher maximum sentence applies 
only if “the offense was committed in furtherance of any criminal or tortious 
act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any 
State.”119  If ACR spent $1,000 as in the previous fact pattern, the offense 
level would be 10 (assuming e-mail addresses alone are not “personal 
 
 112 See id. § 1030(c)(2)(B)(i). 
 113 One study found that a full set of personal information including SSN, address, and 
birthdate had a median price of $21 on the “dark web.” See Keith Collins, Here’s What Your 
Stolen Identity Goes For on the Internet’s Black Market, QUARTZ (July 23, 2015), 
https://qz.com/460482/heres-what-your-stolen-identity-goes-for-on-the-internets-black-
market/ [http://perma.cc/35H7-L57Q]. Others found that bulk data sells for pennies per record. 
See Itay Glick, Darknet: Where Your Stolen Identity Goes to Live, DARK READING (Aug. 19, 
2016), http://www.darkreading.com/endpoint/darknet-where-your-stolen-identity-goes-to-
live/a/d-id/1326679 [http://perma.cc/JCH4-J4Z9]; Brian Krebs, How Much is Your Identity 
Worth?, KREBS ON SECURITY (Nov. 8, 2011), https://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/11/how-
much-is-your-identity-worth/ [http://perma.cc/4WAM-X4RJ]. Even at a nickel per record, 
however, a set of 100,000 records would be worth $5000. 
 114 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(a). 
 115 Id. § 3B1.3. 
 116 Id. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C). 
 117 Id. § 2B1.1(b)(17). 
 118 In 2011, one could buy a million e-mail addresses for $25. Carlton Purvis, $00.000025: 
The Going Rate on the Black Market for Your Email Address, SECURITY MGMT. (Aug. 26, 
2011), https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/00000025-going-rate-black-market-your-email-
address- 008950.aspx [http://perma.cc/4V5J-RPTQ]. 
 119 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(2)(B)(ii). 
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information” as defined in the guidelines),120 which corresponds to a sentence 
of 6 to 12 months—a reduction of 2 offense level points and four months of 
presumptive sentence. 
Next, consider the possible sentences if ACR responded to Tom’s hack 
by hiring consultants and investigators and notifying all 1,000 customers of 
the breach by regular mail and phone calls, at a cost of $300,000.  The 
perceived severity of the crime would increase due to the larger loss by a 
mere 3.65 points on the 100-point scale, but the offense level would more 
than double, to a total of 22.121  The presumptive range would be 41–51 
months with a statutory maximum of one year.  The weight the guidelines 
place on loss under section 2B1.1 greatly outdistances not only the increase 
in perceived severity resulting from the greater loss but also the statutory 
maximum.  And two facts that contributed little or nothing to the offense 
level in the previous fact pattern—the motive and value of the information 
obtained—turn out to be critical threshold issues.  Changing the motive from 
activism to financial gain or the value of the data from sub-$5,000 to more 
than $5,000 can change a one-year maximum sentence to a recommended 
sentence of at least three and a half years. 
Finally, assume the first set of facts again: profit motive, 100,000 
records, and data consisting of full names, addresses, phone numbers, dates 
of birth, and social security numbers.  But as in the previous example, ACR 
spent $300,000 reacting to the incident.  The offense level would be 24: 12 
as in the first fact pattern plus 12 for the amount of loss.  The recommended 
sentencing range is 51 to 63 months.  Because the motive is financial gain 
and the records consist of personal information, the maximum sentence is 
five years.   
Two lessons can be gleaned from these examples (which Table 6 
summarizes).  First, as mentioned, the amount of loss has an outsized effect 
on recommended sentences compared to the importance of that factor on 
perceptions of crime seriousness.  A change in loss that increases the 
perceived seriousness of a crime by less than 4 points on a 100-point scale 
can increase the recommended sentencing range from 10–16 months to      
51–63 months.  Second, because motive and the sensitivity of the data can 
 
 120 The sentencing guidelines define “personal information” as “sensitive or private 
information involving an identifiable individual (including such information in the possession 
of a third party), including (A) medical records; (B) wills; (C) diaries; (D) private 
correspondence, including e-mail; (E) financial records; (F) photographs of a sensitive or 
private nature; or (G) similar information.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 
cmt.1 (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2016). 
 121 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1) (listing a 12-point increase in 
offense level for an offense with more than $250,000 in loss). 
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increase maximum sentences but have only minimal effect on calculations 
under the guidelines, their impact primarily depends on whether a prosecutor 
can find other ways (such as charging additional crimes to create “another 
offense” or by coming up with creative valuations of data) to increase the 
maximum sentence. 
Apart from the language about gaining access to the company’s internal 
network, our hypothetical is similar to the facts of the case against Andrew 
“Weev” Auernheimer, who discovered a vulnerability in AT&T’s web site 
for iPad registrations and downloaded more than 100,000 records.122  
Auernheimer was convicted of conspiracy and identity fraud.123  He received 
a sentence of 41 months that was overturned on jurisdictional grounds.124 
The government argued for an offense level of 20, which carried a 
presumptive sentencing range of 33–41 months.  The offense level was based 
on a base offense level of 6; three 2-point enhancements for use of a special 
skill, use of sophisticated means, and dissemination of personal information; 
and an 8-point enhancement for a loss of $73,000 incurred by AT&T in 
mailing notices to affected customers.125  The base offense level and 
enhancements for special skills and sophisticated means accounted for ten 
offense levels, corresponding to a presumptive sentencing range of 6–12 
months.  The two-point enhancement for use of a special skill alone would 
have increased that to 10–16 months.  The enhancement for amount of loss 
would have increased the guidelines range from 6–12 months to 27–33 
 
 122 See Kim Zetter, AT&T Hacker ‘Weev’ Sentenced to 3.5 Years in Prison, WIRED (Mar. 
18, 2013), https://www.wired.com/2013/03/att-hacker-gets-3-years/ [http://perma.cc/TU6G-
YD44]. 
 123 Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v. Auernheimer, No. 2:11-cr-470 (D.N.J. 
Mar. 19, 2013), ECF No. 92. 
 124 Id.  
 125 Letter from United States, Auernheimer, No. 2:11-cr-470 (D.N.J. Mar. 15, 2013), ECF 
No. 89. 
Table 6: Sentencing examples for the factorial scenario 
 Loss: $1000 Loss: $300,000 (+3.65) 
Motive: Profiteer (+10.5) 
Scope:  100,000 records (+2.7) 
Records: Name, addr, phone no., DOB, SSN (+11.7) 
Offense level: 12 
Guideline range: 10–16 mo. 
Max: 5 years 
Offense level: 24 
Guideline range: 51–63 mo. 
Max: 5 years 
Motive: Activist 
Scope: 1,000 records 
Records: E-mail addresses 
Offense level: 10 
Guideline range: 6–12 mo. 
Max: 1 year 
Offense level: 22 
Guideline range: 41–51 mo. 
Max: 1 year 
Note: The table lists offense levels, recommended sentencing ranges, and maximum sentences 
for the fact values listed. Values in parentheses are the modeled change, on a 100-point scale, 
in perceived severity compared to the lower level, assuming all other factors are held fixed at 
the mean (e.g., a loss of $300,000 is modeled as 3.65 points higher on the 100-point scale than 
a loss of $1000). 
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months.  Thus, the amount of loss—the $73,000 AT&T spent notifying 
customers—increased Auernheimer’s presumptive sentence five times more 
than the type of data did.126  Note, however, that the fact that Auernheimer 
was accused of accessing identifying information with the intent to commit 
a violation of federal law allowed him to be prosecuted under the identity 
theft statute, which is also sentenced under section 2B1.1 of the guidelines 
but carries a five-year maximum sentence.  Had he been charged under the 
CFAA, the government would have had to show that the value of the 
information Auernheimer obtained was more than $5,000.127 
As mentioned in section 2, most CFAA offenses are sentenced under 
section 2B1.1 of the guidelines, which covers economic crimes such as fraud 
and larceny.  Our results support arguments that this is a poor fit.128 The 
heavy reliance that section 2B1.1 places on the amount of loss in calculating 
a recommended sentence is not reflected in public perceptions.  Meanwhile, 
factors that our respondents do rate as important, such as motive, type of data, 
and scope, are barely factors in 2B1.1. 
C. LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
We emphasize, as Rossi, Simpson, and Miller did in 1985,129 that we do 
not claim that sentences should be determined by public opinion.  As we 
mentioned at the beginning of this article, lay opinions of sentencing are 
subject to biases, lack of information, and misperceptions.  However, these 
perceptions do inform public policy decisions.  When perceptions are wildly 
out of line with sentencing mechanisms, it is worth asking whether those 
mechanisms truly achieve public policy objectives.  Furthermore, our 
measurement of perceptions is focused on the relative importance of various 
factors rather than on the comparison of total sentences. 
The experiments we have discussed are all based on vignettes 
describing a data breach.  But there are many types of cybercrime, including 
payment card fraud, scamming, online banking fraud, phishing, and viruses.  
A natural extension of our work would be to compare different types of 
cybercrime.  In addition, we intend to study how cybercrimes are perceived 
in comparison with similar real-world crimes. 
Another limitation of this work is that it ignores many victim and 
offender characteristics, other than the offender’s cleverness.  The victims in 
 
 126 As Orin Kerr notes, “the Guidelines recommended two extra years in jail because 
AT&T opted to mail out a postal letter.” Kerr, supra note 45, at 1557–58. 
 127 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(2)(b)(iii). 
 128 See Kerr, supra note 45, at 1554–56. 
 129 Rossi et al., supra note 9, at 61. 
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our scenarios are limited to a corporation and generic data subjects. But 
victim characteristics may be important too.  Although other offender and 
victim characteristics should not bias our results, assuming these unobserved 
characteristics and participant assumptions about them were distributed 
randomly, it is possible that the effects we do measure are smaller than those 
we chose to ignore. 
Because we use MTurk for our respondent sample, the results should 
not be considered representative of the U.S. population at large.  Although 
MTurk studies have been shown to be better than most “samples of 
convenience,” biases may exist within the MTurker community that affect 
our results. 
The surprising appearance of data sensitivity among statistically 
significant results of other manipulations suggests that perceptions of data 
sensitivity might be another area for future research.  The public’s 
perceptions of fault on the part of breached organizations is another area of 
possible further study. 
Finally, although the studies we describe in this article support the 
argument that most computer crimes should not be sentenced as fraud crimes, 
our results say nothing about whether trespass is the correct analogue.  
Computer crimes also have features of burglary, for example.  Future work 
might explore this further. 
D. CONCLUSION 
An attacker’s motivation, the type of data affected, and the amount of 
loss are all statistically significant factors in perceptions of the seriousness of 
a Computer Fraud and Abuse Act crime.  Sentencing under the Act places 
tremendous weight on the amount of loss.  But that weight is not reflected in 
public attitudes.  Another factor in sentencing—the target of the crime—
appears to have no statistically significant effect on perceptions.  In contrast, 
the most important factor in public ratings of crime seriousness is the 
attacker’s motivation, which has a much less drastic impact in the sentencing 
guidelines. 
We stress again that sentences should not be determined solely by public 
opinion.  But if the criminal codes “reflect through the state legislature’s 
deliberations and actions some understanding, however dim and remote, of 
what ‘the public’ deems appropriate for the crimes in question,”130 it is 
reasonable to ask whether those reflections are distorted.  Our research 
suggests that they are. 
  
 
 130 Id. at 59–60. 
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APPENDIX A: U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES TABLE 
 





































(in months of imprisonment) 
 





(0 or 1) 
II 
(2 or 3) 
 III 
(4, 5, 6) 
 IV 
(7, 8, 9) 
 V 
(10, 11, 12) 
 VI 
(13 or more) 
            
 
Zone A 
1 0-6 0-6  0-6  0-6  0-6  0-6 
2 0-6 0-6  0-6  0-6  0-6  1-7 
3 0-6 0-6  0-6  0-6  2-8  3-9 
           4 0-6 0-6  0-6  2-8  4-10  6-12 
5 0-6 0-6  1-7  4-10  6-12  9-15 
6 0-6 1-7  2-8  6-12  9-15  12-18 
           7 0-6 2-8  4-10  8-14  12-18  15-21 
8 0-6 4-10  6-12  10-16  15-21  18-24 
Zone B 
9 4-10 6-12  8-14  12-18  18-24  21-27 
           
10 6-12 8-14  10-16  15-21  21-27  24-30 




12 10-16 12-18  15-21  21-27  27-33  30-37 
           13 12-18 15-21  18-24  24-30  30-37  33-41 
Zone D 
14 15-21 18-24  21-27  27-33  33-41  37-46 
15 18-24 21-27  24-30  30-37  37-46  41-51 
           
16 21-27 24-30  27-33  33-41  41-51  46-57 
17 24-30 27-33  30-37  37-46  46-57  51-63 
18 27-33 30-37  33-41  41-51  51-63  57-71 
           
19 30-37 33-41  37-46  46-57  57-71  63-78 
20 33-41 37-46  41-51  51-63  63-78  70-87 
21 37-46 41-51  46-57  57-71  70-87  77-96 
           
22 41-51 46-57  51-63  63-78  77-96  84-105 
23 46-57 51-63  57-71  70-87  84-105  92-115 
24 51-63 57-71  63-78  77-96  92-115  100-125 
           
25 57-71 63-78  70-87  84-105  100-125  110-137 
26 63-78 70-87  78-97  92-115  110-137  120-150 
27 70-87 78-97  87-108  100-125  120-150  130-162 
           
28 78-97 87-108  97-121  110-137  130-162  140-175 
29 87-108 97-121  108-135  121-151  140-175  151-188 
30 97-121 108-135  121-151  135-168  151-188  168-210 
           
31 108-135 121-151  135-168  151-188  168-210  188-235 
32 121-151 135-168  151-188  168-210  188-235  210-262 
33 135-168 151-188  168-210  188-235  210-262  235-293 
           
34 151-188 168-210  188-235  210-262  235-293  262-327 
35 168-210 188-235  210-262  235-293  262-327  292-365 
36 188-235 210-262  235-293  262-327  292-365  324-405 
           
37 210-262 235-293  262-327  292-365  324-405  360-life 
38 235-293 262-327  292-365  324-405  360-life  360-life 
39 262-327 292-365  324-405  360-life  360-life  360-life 
           
40 292-365 324-405  360-life  360-life  360-life  360-life 
41 324-405 360-life  360-life  360-life  360-life  360-life 
42 360-life 360-life  360-life  360-life  360-life  360-life 
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APPENDIX B: REGRESSION TABLES FOR BETWEEN-SUBJECTS EXPERIMENTS 
(STUDY I) 
 
Table 8: Ordered probit marginal effects for the Type of Data experiment  
 Wrongful Harmful Serious Harsh Sensitive Respons. Clever 
Medical data  -0.104  0.194  0.076  -0.028  0.970***  0.015  0.008 
  (0.142)  (0.145)  (0.148)  (0.145)  (0.151)  (0.153)  (0.143) 
Female  0.435**  0.259  0.348*  0.084  0.349*  0.416**  -0.027 
  (0.147)  (0.156)  (0.153)  (0.158)  (0.162)  (0.150)  (0.143) 
US birth  -0.209  0.141  0.322  0.040  0.521  -0.354  0.177 
  (0.227)  (0.348)  (0.295)  (0.293)  (0.326)  (0.447)  (0.214) 
CFIP score  0.563***  0.197  0.304**  0.295**  0.501***  0.281*  0.235 
  (0.110)  (0.116)  (0.104)  (0.102)  (0.117)  (0.116)  (0.131) 
Freq. aff by cybercrime  -0.016  -0.003  -0.127  -0.081  -0.142  0.122  -0.301* 
  (0.132)  (0.110)  (0.117)  (0.130)  (0.131)  (0.095)  (0.131) 
Fake personal info  -0.010  -0.032  -0.046  -0.093  -0.083  0.040  -0.018 
  (0.061)  (0.060)  (0.056)  (0.056)  (0.063)  (0.061)  (0.058) 
Media awareness  -0.083  -0.026  0.009  0.016  0.033  0.077  0.064 
  (0.051)  (0.049)  (0.049)  (0.044)  (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.053) 
AC: Data  0.490  0.396  0.117  -0.106  0.069  -0.660*  -0.204 
  (0.257)  (0.297)  (0.252)  (0.248)  (0.282)  (0.307)  (0.239) 
AC: Context  -0.287  -0.296  -0.474**  -0.306*  -0.343*  0.100  0.154 
   (0.166)  (0.179)  (0.164)  (0.150)  (0.163)  (0.173)  (0.165) 
AC: Scope  -0.379  -0.564**  -0.502*  -0.165  -0.410  0.256  -0.127 
  (0.194)  (0.209)  (0.212)  (0.184)  (0.229)  (0.196)  (0.208) 
N 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 
pseudo R2 0.079 0.048 0.053 0.047 0.128 0.060 0.045 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Notes: The table shows ordered probit regression results for responses to the seven main Likert 
questions in the Type of Data experiment. The “Medical data” condition is versus the baseline 
condition of directory data. Regressions also included categorical control variables for 
occupation, age, education, and work situation. 
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Table 9: Ordered probit regression results for the Scope experiment  
 Wrongful Harmful Serious Harsh Sensitive Respons. Clever 
log(Num. Records)  0.070**  0.078**  0.159***  0.107***  0.135***  0.064*  0.057* 
  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.028)  (0.026)  (0.031)  (0.026)  (0.025) 
Female  0.186  0.045  -0.014  0.109  0.240*  -0.145  0.096 
  (0.097)  (0.095)  (0.095)  (0.092)  (0.110)  (0.094)  (0.093) 
US birth  -0.249  0.028  -0.296  -0.309  -0.210  -0.033  -0.435 
  (0.194)  (0.211)  (0.159)  (0.207)  (0.272)  (0.234)  (0.234) 
CFIP score  0.361***  0.242***  0.381***  0.241***  0.628***  0.210**  0.261*** 
  (0.067)  (0.070)  (0.071)  (0.067)  (0.081)  (0.069)  (0.065) 
Freq. aff by cybercrime  -0.095  -0.072  -0.187**  -0.102  -0.185*  -0.023  -0.025 
  (0.063)  (0.060)  (0.063)  (0.062)  (0.076)  (0.061)  (0.063) 
Fake personal info  0.049  -0.045  -0.019  -0.013  -0.032  0.017  0.063 
  (0.040)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.037)  (0.045)  (0.039)  (0.039) 
Media awareness  -0.044  -0.028  -0.032  -0.027  -0.036  0.047  -0.006 
  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.029)  (0.036)  (0.033)  (0.031) 
AC: Data  -0.020  -0.133  -0.173  -0.121  0.038  0.010  0.334* 
  (0.138)  (0.137)  (0.134)  (0.134)  (0.162)  (0.139)  (0.142) 
AC: Context  0.028  -0.010  -0.082  -0.159  0.276  0.107  0.163 
  (0.136)  (0.144)  (0.119)  (0.132)  (0.162)  (0.131)  (0.141) 
AC: Scope  0.104  -0.031  0.072  0.262*  0.030  -0.056  0.216 
  (0.126)  (0.133)  (0.127)  (0.130)  (0.151)  (0.128)  (0.140) 
N 583 583 583 583 583 583 583 
pseudo R2  0.048  0.029  0.046  0.034  0.097  0.023  0.031 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Notes: The table shows ordered probit regression results for responses to the seven main Likert 
questions in the Scope experiment. Regressions also included categorical control variables for 
occupation, age, education, and work situation. 
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Table 10: Ordered probit regression results for the Motivation experiment 
(vs. Profiteer)  
 Wrongful Harmful Serious Harsh Pot. Harm Sensitive Respons. Clever 
Student  -0.878***  -0.327*  -0.596***  -0.793***  -0.051  0.201  0.034  0.217 
  (0.151)  (0.148)  (0.150)  (0.145)  (0.150)  (0.141)  (0.141)  (0.147) 
Activist  -0.795***  -0.279  -0.538***  -0.497***  -0.294  0.130  0.100  0.191 
  (0.150)  (0.145)  (0.152)  (0.147)  (0.159)  (0.154)  (0.145)  (0.152) 
Female  0.035  -0.037  0.056  -0.051  0.068  -0.106  0.364**  0.001 
  (0.121)  (0.123)  (0.126)  (0.128)  (0.129)  (0.121)  (0.124)  (0.119) 
US birth  -0.088  0.078  -0.050  0.335  0.042  -0.268  0.053  -0.339 
  (0.212)  (0.259)  (0.225)  (0.252)  (0.274)  (0.234)  (0.318)  (0.247) 
CFIP score  0.238**  0.181  0.295**  0.223*  0.255**  0.341***  0.140  0.371*** 
  (0.090)  (0.094)  (0.092)  (0.097)  (0.088)  (0.087)  (0.087)  (0.085) 
Freq. aff by cybercrime  0.084  -0.047  0.114  -0.014  0.050  0.011  -0.121  -0.044 
 (0.093)  (0.085)  (0.092)  (0.098)  (0.091)  (0.095)  (0.090)  (0.095) 
Fake personal info  0.003  -0.007  0.052  -0.007  0.027  -0.029  0.059  -0.045 
  (0.053)  (0.051)  (0.053)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.051)  (0.053) 
Media awareness  0.009  0.100*  0.053  0.033  0.100*  0.026  0.030  -0.029 
  (0.044)  (0.047)  (0.045)  (0.043)  (0.047)  (0.042)  (0.044)  (0.042) 
AC: Data  -0.313**  -0.115  -0.220  -0.285*  -0.223  -0.510***  0.081  -0.002 
  (0.121)  (0.131)  (0.121)  (0.128)  (0.138)  (0.126)  (0.130)  (0.135) 
AC: Context  0.058  0.205  0.031  0.093  -0.170  0.032  0.250  0.192 
  (0.155)  (0.151)  (0.159)  (0.155)  (0.157)  (0.156)  (0.160)  (0.159) 
AC: Scope  0.039  -0.113  0.091  -0.042  -0.079  0.110  -0.079  0.205 
  (0.138)  (0.129)  (0.133)  (0.139)  (0.142)  (0.135)  (0.130)  (0.142) 
AC: Motivation  -0.208  -0.140  -0.244  -0.234  -0.327  -0.567**  -0.126  -0.014 
  (0.179)  (0.192)  (0.177)  (0.170)  (0.188)  (0.178)  (0.174)  (0.189) 
N 361 361 361 361 361 361 361 361 
pseudo R2  0.083  0.046  0.052  0.071  0.057  0.056  0.033  0.048 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
Notes: The table shows ordered probit regression results for responses to the eight main Likert 
questions in the Motivation experiment. The “Student” and “Activist” motivation conditions 
are versus the “Profiteer” baseline condition. Regressions also included categorical control 
variables for occupation, age, education, and work situation. 
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Table 11: Ordered probit regression results for the Consequences experiment 
(vs. Low condition)  
 Wrongful Harmful Serious Harsh Pot. Harm Sensitive Respons. Clever 
Acme High  0.179  0.407***  0.083  0.338**  0.147  -0.009  -0.123  -0.020 
  (0.123)  (0.122)  (0.119)  (0.123)  (0.137)  (0.140)  (0.116)  (0.118) 
Customers High  0.042  0.377**  0.131  0.236*  0.093  0.040  0.112  -0.125 
  (0.125)  (0.120)  (0.121)  (0.118)  (0.138)  (0.151)  (0.126)  (0.124) 
Female  0.157  0.113  0.163  0.150  0.261*  0.201  0.129  0.089 
  (0.106)  (0.103)  (0.101)  (0.101)  (0.116)  (0.122)  (0.106)  (0.103) 
US birth  0.067  -0.116  0.157  0.116  0.008  -0.130  0.071  -0.096 
  (0.241)  (0.216)  (0.241)  (0.240)  (0.218)  (0.269)  (0.287)  (0.213) 
CFIP score  0.212**  0.168*  0.294***  0.167*  0.417***  0.650***  0.222**  0.119 
  (0.076)  (0.082)  (0.078)  (0.080)  (0.101)  (0.104)  (0.074)  (0.078) 
Freq. aff by cybercrime  -0.021  -0.002  -0.034  0.007  -0.015  -0.099  0.010  0.020 
  (0.079)  (0.076)  (0.078)  (0.077)  (0.088)  (0.097)  (0.075)  (0.073) 
Fake personal info  -0.108*  -0.054  -0.094*  -0.115**  -0.026  0.000  0.091*  0.017 
  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.041)  (0.052)  (0.048)  (0.043)  (0.041) 
Media awareness  -0.047  0.028  -0.029  -0.023  0.075  0.052  0.042  0.028 
  (0.039)  (0.037)  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.045)  (0.048)  (0.040)  (0.037) 
AC: Data  0.416**  0.139  0.243  0.211  0.327*  0.471*  0.326*  0.090 
  (0.155)  (0.140)  (0.144)  (0.143)  (0.167)  (0.186)  (0.143)  (0.148) 
AC: Context  -0.090  -0.068  0.039  -0.060  -0.054  -0.013  -0.336**  -0.128 
  (0.128)  (0.114)  (0.126)  (0.119)  (0.140)  (0.149)  (0.125)  (0.129) 
AC: Scope  -0.010  -0.111  -0.104  -0.127  -0.070  0.119  0.110  0.145 
  (0.109)  (0.111)  (0.111)  (0.109)  (0.124)  (0.133)  (0.115)  (0.108) 
AC: Consequence  -0.089  -0.121  -0.130  -0.206  -0.183  -0.175  0.197  0.068 
  (0.166)  (0.202)  (0.185)  (0.186)  (0.213)  (0.205)  (0.165)  (0.179) 
N 479 479 479 479 479 479 479 479 
pseudo R2  0.047  0.034  0.040  0.040  0.078  0.117  0.034  0.017 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
Notes: The table shows ordered probit regression results for responses to the eight main Likert 
questions in the Consequences experiment. The “Acme High” and “Customers High” 
motivation conditions are the conditions in which Acme was described as experiencing high 
losses and its customers were described as experiencing high losses, respectively. Both were 
rare versus the “Low” baseline condition in which Acme was described as experiencing 
minimal losses. Regressions also included categorical control variables for occupation, age, 
education, and work situation. 
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Table 12: Ordered probit regressions for the Co-Responsibility experiment  
 Wrongful Harmful Serious Harsh Pot. Harm Sensitive Respons. Clever 
Not Patched  0.133  0.102  0.157  0.074  0.087  -0.370*  0.423***  -0.184 
  (0.136)  (0.136)  (0.133)  (0.132)  (0.151)  (0.164)  (0.128)  (0.136) 
Female  0.197  0.192  0.144  0.060  0.154  -0.045  0.151  0.029 
  (0.147)  (0.153)  (0.151)  (0.143)  (0.162)  (0.175)  (0.142)  (0.149) 
US birth  0.225  -0.758*  0.366  0.227  -0.337  -0.593  -0.509  0.214 
  (0.356)  (0.298)  (0.274)  (0.234)  (0.433)  (0.456)  (0.356)  (0.391) 
CFIP score  0.576***  0.391**  0.557***  0.385***  0.701***  1.087***  0.249*  0.364** 
  (0.120)  (0.130)  (0.117)  (0.113)  (0.137)  (0.141)  (0.113)  (0.125) 
Freq. aff by cybercrime  -0.007  0.035  -0.026  -0.048  0.034  0.011  0.097  0.002 
 (0.084)  (0.089)  (0.104)  (0.094)  (0.107)  (0.118)  (0.100)  (0.098) 
Fake personal info  -0.016  -0.154*  0.001  -0.121  0.025  -0.004  -0.051  0.066 
  (0.059)  (0.065)  (0.066)  (0.063)  (0.070)  (0.066)  (0.062)  (0.070) 
Media awareness  0.030  0.113*  0.093  0.076  0.041  -0.069  0.177**  0.064 
  (0.048)  (0.050)  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.056)  (0.062)  (0.054)  (0.054) 
AC: Data  -0.271  -0.305  -0.343  -0.060  -0.071  -0.202  -0.197  0.185 
  (0.206)  (0.219)  (0.189)  (0.218)  (0.206)  (0.270)  (0.202)  (0.201) 
AC: Context  -0.359*  -0.359*  -0.286  -0.234  -0.553**  -0.251  -0.144  0.075 
  (0.162)  (0.150)  (0.161)  (0.148)  (0.178)  (0.192)  (0.162)  (0.169) 
AC: Scope  0.007  0.234  0.271  0.082  0.494**  0.384*  0.226  0.200 
  (0.189)  (0.177)  (0.171)  (0.160)  (0.192)  (0.177)  (0.181)  (0.169) 
AC: Patched  -0.294  -0.333  -0.184  -0.283  -0.277  -0.462  -0.359  0.032 
  (0.234)  (0.229)  (0.209)  (0.212)  (0.286)  (0.284)  (0.225)  (0.240) 
N 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 
pseudo R2  0.061  0.053  0.052  0.039  0.107  0.167  0.057  0.050 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
Notes: The table shows ordered probit regression results for responses to the eight main Likert 
questions in the Co-responsibility experiment. The “Not Patched” condition is versus the 
“Patched” baseline condition in which Acme was described as having patched its servers. 
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Table 13: Ordered probit regressions for the Context experiment (vs. Bank)  
 Wrongful Harmful Serious Harsh Pot. Harm Sensitive Respons. Clever 
Government  -0.055  0.013  -0.027  -0.030  0.147  -0.121  0.152  -0.023 
  (0.119)  (0.121)  (0.125)  (0.116)  (0.139)  (0.142)  (0.118)  (0.116) 
Non-Profit  0.048  -0.029  -0.222  0.030  0.099  -0.208  -0.361**  -0.185 
  (0.123)  (0.124)  (0.122)  (0.121)  (0.140)  (0.155)  (0.120)  (0.121) 
Org. size  0.055  0.064  0.045  0.053  0.133**  0.148**  0.059  0.142** 
  (0.044)  (0.041)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.048)  (0.050)  (0.046)  (0.046) 
Female  0.002  0.000  -0.044  -0.018  0.090  0.068  0.157  0.127 
  (0.102)  (0.101)  (0.100)  (0.099)  (0.116)  (0.118)  (0.096)  (0.100) 
US birth  -0.069  -0.094  0.071  -0.157  -0.292  0.158  0.116  -0.050 
  (0.281)  (0.276)  (0.226)  (0.250)  (0.284)  (0.376)  (0.301)  (0.276) 
CFIP score  0.354***  0.191*  0.376***  0.207**  0.405***  0.518***  0.139  0.135 
  (0.073)  (0.077)  (0.073)  (0.080)  (0.085)  (0.077)  (0.075)  (0.073) 
Freq. aff by cybercrime  -0.020  -0.027  -0.052  -0.044  -0.118  0.004  -0.026  0.047 
  (0.064)  (0.063)  (0.064)  (0.060)  (0.073)  (0.077)  (0.064)  (0.069) 
Fake personal info  -0.021  0.003  -0.016  -0.007  0.053  -0.078  0.013  -0.009 
  (0.041)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.037)  (0.045)  (0.044)  (0.042)  (0.040) 
Media awareness  -0.026  -0.046  0.030  -0.010  -0.030  -0.010  0.065  0.062 
  (0.036)  (0.038)  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.044)  (0.043)  (0.037)  (0.037) 
AC: Data  0.023  0.019  0.029  0.017  0.376*  0.372*  -0.184  -0.053 
  (0.153)  (0.151)  (0.153)  (0.152)  (0.161)  (0.156)  (0.123)  (0.142) 
AC: Context  -0.003  0.066  -0.196  0.010  -0.024  -0.036  -0.101  -0.153 
  (0.129)  (0.133)  (0.128)  (0.134)  (0.144)  (0.160)  (0.123)  (0.129) 
AC: Scope  -0.152  0.051  -0.101  -0.035  -0.028  0.168  -0.022  0.035 
  (0.122)  (0.136)  (0.126)  (0.123)  (0.144)  (0.142)  (0.127)  (0.126) 
N 502 502 502 502 502 502 502 502 
pseudo R2  0.044  0.022  0.045  0.029  0.073  0.092  0.028  0.034 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
Notes: The table shows ordered probit regression results for responses to the eight main Likert 
questions in the Context experiment. The “Government” and “Non-profit” conditions are 
versus the “Bank” baseline condition. Regressions also included categorical control variables 
for occupation, age, education, and work situation. 
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APPENDIX C: INTER-RESPONDENT HETEROGENEITY 
 
To explore the extent to which respondents agree in their perceptions, we ran 
individual regressions for each of the 223 respondents in our experiment. The 
statistical power in the individual-level regressions is limited by the fact that 
each respondent rated only 25 vignettes.131 The explanatory power of many 
of the individual regressions is reasonably good, however. Adjusted R2 
values range from -0.305 to .952 with a median of 0.627.  
 Table 14 lists the percentage of responses for which each coefficient 
was statistically significant at p < 0.05 and p < 0.01. As should be expected 
from such a small value of 𝑁, only a small percentage of individual 
regressions showed statistically significant coefficients. The most frequently 
significant coefficient (other than the constant term) is log(Sentence), which 
was significant at 𝑝 <  0.05 in 34% of individual regressions. All the 
variables of interest except those involving organization type were 
significant at rates higher than the corresponding 𝑝 level (i.e., the coefficient 
was significant at 𝑝 <  0.05 for more than 5% of responses). Table 15 shows 
summary statistics for the coefficients across individual-level regressions. 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 are histograms of the coefficients for each variable of 
interest across the individual-level regressions. As the table and figures show, 
there is wide variation in the coefficients that result from individual-level 
regressions. Unsurprisingly, the distributions are often skewed in the same 
direction as overall-level results, but each factor seems to have both negative 
and positive correlations with perceived severity depending on the 
respondent. But note that this table summarizes coefficients for all regression 
results regardless of whether the coefficients it summarizes are statistically 
significant. 
These results suggest—though not conclusively, considering the small 
number of observations per respondent—that there is quite a bit of variation 




 131 As we discuss in Section 2, supra, we scaled back to 25 vignettes per respondent after 
a pilot study with 40 vignettes per person exhibited technical problems and high dropout rates. 
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Table 14: Statistically-significant coefficients as percentages of individual-
level regressions 
 % p < 0.01 % p < 0.05 
log(Records) 4.0 12.1 
log(Org Loss) 2.7 10.3 
log(Cust Loss) 1.3 8.1 
Organization (vs. Bank)   
   Government 0.9 5.8 
   Non-profit 0.9 7.2 
   Insurer 1.3 4.5 
Data (vs. E-mail)   
   Name, addr, SSN 5.8 14.8 
   Health 6.3 13.0 
   Name, phone, addr, DOB, SSN 7.2 16.1 
   Name, phone, addr 1.3 9.4 
   Name, user ID, pwd 3.1 10.8 
Motivation (vs. Profiteer)   
   Student 6.7 15.2 
   Activist 9.0 16.1 
log(Sentence) 13.0 33.6 
Probation 5.4 12.6 
log(Sentence) x Probation 2.7 12.6 
_cons 22.0 41.7 
Notes: The table shows the percentage of individual-level regressions with statistically 
significant coefficients for each variable. For example, the coefficient for log (Records) was 
statistically significant at p < 0.05 for 12.1% of the individual-level regressions. 
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Table 15: Summary statistics for coefficients across individual-level 
regressions 
var mean sd 5% median 95% N 
cons  56.29  42.44  -14.77  54.57  130.17 223 
log(records)  0.66  1.43  -1.51  0.51  3.23 223 
log(cust_loss)  0.72  4.22  -5.66  0.31  8.09 223 
log(org_loss)  0.52  1.86  -2.57  0.40  3.43 223 
Organization (vs. Bank)       
   Govt.  -1.19  16.57  -31.70  -2.03  24.74 223 
   Non-Profit  -2.76  16.35  -27.97  -2.01  21.63 223 
   Insurer  -1.10  16.04  -25.12  -0.19  23.11 223 
Data (vs. E-mail)       
   Name, addr, SSN  9.25  21.39  -19.21  6.82  44.14 223 
   Health  10.63  24.10  -31.56  9.77  49.37 217 
   Directory+DOB, SSN  11.93  21.61  -18.72  9.55  48.90 223 
   Directory  5.53  20.21  -27.15  4.03  40.15 222 
   Name, user ID, 
password 
 7.69  19.35  -24.14  5.45  43.34 221 
Motive (vs. Profiteer)       
   Student  -8.94  16.44  -34.79  -7.71  13.03 223 
   Activist  -10.03  16.18  -37.59  -8.91  13.51 223 
log(sentence)  -9.01  9.61  -23.21  -9.29  8.36 223 
probation  6.68  32.42  -49.98  6.12  57.09 223 
log(sentence) x 
probation 
 2.58  11.94  -19.37  3.26  21.98 223 
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Figure 2: Distribution of β values over respondent-level models for non-log-




















Figure 3: Distribution of β values over respondent-level models for log-
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